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I. INTRODUCTION
As Hillary Jones and her family drove through an intersection, a U.S. 
Forest Service water truck sped through a red light and struck the side of 
Hillary’s car.1  She suffered serious internal injuries and mental trauma, 
placing her in a neurovegetative state.2  Because of her extensive injuries, 
Hillary lives in a long-term care facility.3 Patients in a persistent vegetative
state, such as Hillary, suffer from severe brain damage and are in a coma 
that puts them in a state of “wakefulness without detectable awareness.”4 
When Hillary’s representative sued the United States government in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of California, he
requested both compensatory and punitive damages.5  However, despite
the fact that Hillary can no longer grow old with her husband or watch
her children become adults, some courts would claim that she was not 
entitled to damages for her loss of joy.6 
1. Scott Marshall, Poway Crash Results in Lawsuit Against U.S. Government, N. 
COUNTY TIMES (June 8, 2007, 12:00 AM), http://www.nctimes.com/news/local/article_3671 




4. The Multi-Society Task Force on PVS, Medical Aspects of the Persistent 
Vegetative State (pt. 1), 330 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1499, 1499 (1994), available at http://www.
nejm.org/doi/pdf/10.1056/NEJM199405263302107. 
5. Marshall, supra note 1. Compensatory damages seek to compensate the plaintiff 
for the actual injury suffered while punitive damages seek to punish the wrongdoer. See
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333 (West 2013) (defining compensatory damages as “the measure of
damages . . . which will compensate for all the detriment proximately caused thereby,
whether it could have been anticipated or not”); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 448 (9th ed.
2009) (defining punitive damages as those “awarded in addition to actual damages when the
defendant acted with recklessness, malice, or deceit; specif[ically] damages assessed by
way of penalizing the wrongdoer or making an example of others”). 
6. See McDougald v. Garber, 536 N.E.2d 372, 375 (N.Y. 1989) (holding that
cognitive awareness is a prerequisite to the recovery of hedonic damages).  Many courts 
have not yet ruled on the recovery of hedonic damages by plaintiffs in a persistent vegetative
state but have ruled on the distinction between hedonic damages and pain and suffering
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Courts award damages to plaintiffs injured by the negligence of others to
compensate them for the harm suffered, rather than to punish the
wrongdoers.7 Compensatory damages fulfill the court’s objective by
replacing what the injured party lost.8 By burdening wrongdoers with
the duty to compensate their own victims, damages also deter future 
wrongdoing.9 
Courts may award plaintiffs in a persistent vegetative state—plaintiffs 
such as Hillary—compensatory damages for pain and suffering, emotional
distress, and loss of enjoyment of life.10  Pain and suffering damages 
identify those sensations that are direct results of a physical injury or
condition.11  By contrast, negligent infliction of emotional distress focuses
on mental or emotional injury, rather than physical injury, caused by the
negligence of another.12  Both pain and suffering and emotional distress
require a showing of some sort of harm suffered by the plaintiff.13 
Indisputably, Hillary is suffering within some meaning of the term,14 but 
(holding that hedonic damages are one component of a larger award for pain and suffering 
damages). In this Comment, the terms loss of joy and loss of enjoyment of life will be
used interchangeably. 
7. See McDougald, 536 N.E.2d at 374.  “The basic goal in awarding damages is 
to fairly and adequately compensate the plaintiff for the injuries and losses sustained.” 
Flannery v. United States (Flannery I), 297 S.E.2d 433, 435 (W. Va. 1982). 
8. See McDougald, 536 N.E.2d at 374 (“The goal is to restore the injured party,
to the extent possible, to the position that would have been occupied had the wrong not
occurred.”).
9. See id. 
10. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333 (“For the breach of an obligation not arising from
contract, the measure of damages, except where otherwise expressly provided by this code, is
the amount which will compensate for all the detriment proximately caused thereby, whether
it could have been anticipated or not.”).
11. Consol. Rail Corp. v. Gottshall (Conrail), 512 U.S. 532, 544 (1994) (quoting
Richard N. Pearson, Liability to Bystanders for Negligently Inflicted Emotional Harm –
A Comment on the Nature of Arbitrary Rules, 34 U. FLA. L. REV. 477, 485 n.45 (1982)). 
12. See id. at 544. 
13. See Nakamura v. Superior Court, 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d 97, 103 (Ct. App. 2000)
(stating that pain and suffering “reflects a consequence of the plaintiff’s personal and
physical injury and a subjective loss for which money could compensate the victim”);
see also 3 JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL., CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CACI § 1620 (2012) 
(stating that to establish a claim of emotional distress, the plaintiff must prove that the
plaintiff “suffered serious emotional distress,” which includes “suffering, anguish, fright, 
horror, nervousness, grief, anxiety, worry, shock, humiliation, and shame”). 
14. Webster’s Dictionary defines suffer as “to submit to or be forced to endure the 
infliction, imposition, or penalty of . . . to cause pain or suffering to . . . to submit to or endure



























    




   
       
   
courts may still withhold an award of pain and suffering or emotional
distress damages because of her diagnosis as a patient in a persistent
vegetative state.15  Patients in a persistent vegetative state can occasionally 
smile, cry, grunt, moan, or even scream.16  Nevertheless, they are neither 
awake nor aware, and it is difficult to prove that they experience pain, 
suffering, or emotional distress.17 
It would seem that the damages awarded to those in a persistent vegetative 
state would be for loss of joy.18  Loss of enjoyment of life represents the 
deprivation of the ability to experience and enjoy certain pleasurable 
sensations due to the impairment of the capability to engage in activities 
formerly enjoyed by the plaintiff.19  Courts frequently refer to these 
damages as hedonic damages, a term that derives its name from the Greek 
word hedonikos, meaning “pleasure” or “pleasing.”20  Although individuals 
in a persistent vegetative state are no longer able to enjoy life and thus
damages may compensate for their loss, courts continue to struggle with
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED 2284
(1986).
15. See, e.g., Flannery v. United States (Flannery II), 718 F.2d 108, 111 (4th Cir.
1983); McDougald v. Garber, 536 N.E.2d 372, 375 (N.Y. 1989). 
16. The Multi-Society Task Force on PVS, supra note 4, at 1500. 
17. Id. at 1501 (“Patients in a vegetative state are unconscious because, although 
they are wakeful, they lack awareness.”).  Patients are diagnosed as being in a persistent 
vegetative state when they meet the following factors:
(1) no evidence of awareness of self or environment and an inability to interact
with others; (2) no evidence of sustained, reproducible, purposeful, or voluntary
behavioral responses to visual, auditory, tactile, or noxious stimuli; (3) no evidence 
of language comprehension or expression; (4) intermittent wakefulness manifested
by the presence of sleep–wake cycles; (5) sufficiently preserved hypothalamic 
and brain-stem autonomic functions to permit survival with medical and nursing 
care; (6) bowel and bladder incontinence; and (7) variably preserved cranial-
nerve reflexes . . . and spinal reflexes.
Id. at 1500. 
18. See 1 CAL. CIVIL PRACTICE TORTS § 5:13 (1992) (defining loss of joy as “the 
impairment of a person’s capacity to engage in recreational or other pleasurable activities 
of a normal person”).  A plaintiff in a persistent vegetative state will obviously be unable 
to engage in recreational or other activities engaged in by a normal, healthy person. 
19. See Bennett v. Lembo, 761 A.2d 494, 498 (N.H. 2000). 
20. See Sherrod v. Berry, 629 F. Supp. 159, 163 (N.D. Ill. 1985).  The term hedonic 
was first suggested by economist Stanley Smith in Sherrod. Id. at 162. Smith suggested 
three assumptions regarding hedonic damages: (1) “the hedonic value of life is not
necessarily dependent on earnings capacity”; (2) hedonic value is independent of “social rank, 
education, and gender”; and (3) “hedonic value is correlated to life expectancy.” Lori A.
Nicholson, Note, Hedonic Damages in Wrongful Death and Survival Actions: The Impact of
Alzheimer’s Disease, 2 ELDER L.J. 249, 253 (1994) (citing Stanley V. Smith, Hedonic 
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whether or not to award damages to plaintiffs in such a condition.21 The
majority of courts distinguish between damages for pain and suffering
and damages for loss of enjoyment of life.22  Some states even preclude
loss of enjoyment of life damages altogether, ruling that plaintiffs in a 
persistent vegetative state are not conscious of their loss.23 
This Comment focuses on the potential injustice to patients in a
persistent vegetative state and the proper manner in which to handle 
these cases.  Based on tort principles underlying the justification for the
award of damages to plaintiffs, including deterrence and compensation, 
plaintiffs in a persistent vegetative state should be entitled to damages 
for loss of enjoyment of life. To allow for these awards, courts must
separate loss of enjoyment of life from pain and suffering, thereby allowing
vegetative plaintiffs who cannot prove that they are in pain to recover 
hedonic damages from their wrongdoers.
Part II discusses the effects the tort reform movement and public 
policy have had on damage awards.  Part III explains both the distinction 
between pain and suffering damages and loss of enjoyment of life damages 
and the various methods by which courts have determined whether to
award hedonic damages to those in a persistent vegetative state.  First, 
this Part analyzes the manner in which courts determine if there is a 
difference between pain and suffering damages and loss of enjoyment of
life damages.  Second, this Part examines how courts determine the loss 
of enjoyment of life damages that are recoverable by patients in a persistent 
vegetative state.  Part IV recommends that courts divide pain and suffering
damages and loss of enjoyment of life damages into separate categories 
of recovery, thereby preventing an injustice to plaintiffs injured by the 
wrongdoing of others and allowing plaintiffs in a persistent vegetative 
21. David Polin, Damages for Loss of Enjoyment of Life, in 49 AM. JUR. PROOF OF 
FACTS 3D 339 § 2 (1998) (“This is one of the relatively rare areas of law where different
jurisdictions apply fundamentally different rules.”). 
22. See Eyoma v. Falco, 589 A.2d 653, 659 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991) (stating
that the majority of jurisdictions allow damages for loss of enjoyment of life “but only as 
one of the numerous factors characterizing a general damage award for pain and suffering”).
The minority of jurisdictions refuses to allow the recovery of any loss of enjoyment of
life damages. Id. at 658–59. 
23. See McDougald v. Garber, 536 N.E.2d 372, 375 (N.Y. 1989) (holding 
that “cognitive awareness is a prerequisite to recovery for loss of enjoyment of life”).
In a similar scenario, the Supreme Court of Ohio ruled that a newborn cannot suffer
hedonic damages because “he or she has not had adequate time to develop an ability to
perform a pleasurable activity or hobby specifically identified to his or her lifestyle.” 








   
  
  
    
    
    
 
 
   
    













     
    
 
   
 
 
state to recover hedonic damages.  Part V reiterates that courts should
separate hedonic damages from pain and suffering damages and allow 
for the recovery of loss of enjoyment of life damages by plaintiffs in a 
persistent vegetative state.
II. THE PURPOSE OF THE TORT SYSTEM AND THE AVAILABLE REMEDIES 
A. Legal Implications of Plaintiffs in an Unconscious State
When an action is brought on behalf of an incompetent individual, the 
court appoints a guardian ad litem or conservator to handle the
incompetent’s litigation matters.24  The court, in hopes that the person 
will have the incompetent’s best interests in mind, generally appoints the 
next of kin or another family member.25 Courts usually favor the spouse 
of an incompetent—or a person the spouse chooses—for appointment as 
the guardian.26 The change in society’s definition of family has complicated
the situation.27 It is often the case that the person with the most knowledge
of the incompetent’s wishes is not related by blood or marriage.28 
Ultimately, the court will appoint the person who best protects the interests 
of the incompetent, sometimes selecting a more distant relative.29 
24. See Peter G. Guthrie, Annotation, Priority and Preference in Appointment of 
Conservator or Guardian for an Incompetent, 65 A.L.R. 3D 991, 995 (1975). In federal 
court, a general guardian, committee, conservator, or a like fiduciary can sue or defend 
on behalf of an incompetent person.  FED. R. CIV. P. 17(c)(1).  If an incompetent person 
does not have an appointed representative, the person “may sue by a next friend or by a 
guardian ad litem.” Id. 17(c)(2).  “The court must appoint a guardian ad litem . . . to protect
a[n] . . . incompetent person who is unrepresented in an action.”  Id.  In California, a
guardian ad litem is appointed for an incompetent person when the court deems it
“expedient,” even if the incompetent person already has a guardian or conservator appointed 
for the person’s estate. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 372(a) (West 2013).  A guardian ad 
litem is “[a] guardian, usu[ally] a lawyer, appointed by the court to appear in a lawsuit on 
behalf of an incompetent or minor party.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 774 (9th ed. 2009). 
A conservator is “[a] guardian, protector, or preserver.”  Id. at 347. 
25. See Guthrie, supra note 24, at 995. 
26. Id. at 996. 
27. See Amy L. Brown, Note, Broadening Anachronistic Notions of “Family” in
Proxy Decisionmaking for Unmarried Adults, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 1029, 1073 (1990).  The 
President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical 
and Behavioral Research used a broad definition of the term family in recognition of the 
fact that “[n]o neat formulas will capture the complexities involved in determining who
among a patient’s friends and relatives knows the patient best and is most capable of
making decisions in the patient’s place.” Id. (quoting PRESIDENT’S COMM’N FOR THE STUDY
OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MED. & BIOMEDICAL & BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO 
FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT 127 (1983)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
28. See id. 
29. See Guthrie, supra note 24, at 997–98.  In the past, some believed that the interests
of the incompetent were best protected by female guardians.  See id. at 996.  However,
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In survival actions, a decedent’s estate sues for claims the decedent
could have pursued had the decedent not died.30  Most states have survival
statutes that allow for personal injury claims to survive the death of the 
injured party.31  The types of damages recoverable in a survival action are
generally the same as those available in actions for personal injuries.32 
Damages in survival actions may include pain and suffering, medical 
expenses, loss of earnings, disability, and in some jurisdictions, punitive 
damages.33  Some states, including California, Arizona, and Colorado, do 
not allow for the recovery of pain and suffering damages in survival
actions.34  The recovery of hedonic damages in survival actions poses many 
of the same problems as the recovery of loss of enjoyment of life damages
Ch. 138, 141 (Md. 1827) (holding that “if the lunatic be a female, it is generally deemed 
most proper to appoint a female committee to take charge of her person” and “the
comfort of the unfortunate person would best be promoted by having his person placed 
under the care of a female committee, as by appointing the wife to be the committee of
her husband”).
30. 10 LOUIS R. FRUMER & MELVIN I. FRIEDMAN, PERSONAL INJURY: ACTIONS, 
DEFENSES, DAMAGES § 45.08 (Matthew Bender rev. ed. 2012). 
31. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 377.30 (West 2013) (“A cause of action that
survives the death of the person entitled to commence an action or proceeding passes to
the decedent’s successor in interest . . . and an action may be commenced by the decedent’s 
personal representative or, if none, by the decedent’s successor in interest.”); N.Y. EST.
POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 11-3.2 (Consol. 2008) (“No cause of action for injury to
person or property is lost because of the death of the person liable for the injury.  For any
injury, an action may be brought or continued against the personal representative of the 
decedent . . . .”).
32. See 10 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 30, § 45.08. 
33. See id.; see also Willinger v. Mercy Catholic Med. Ctr., 362 A.2d 280, 286– 
87 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1976) (allowing for the recovery of medical expenses, past and future
earnings, and pain and suffering endured prior to death). 
34. See  ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-3110 (2012) (West) (“Every cause of action 
. . . shall survive the death of the person entitled thereto or liable therefor, and may be
asserted by or against the personal representative of such person, provided that upon the 
death of the person injured, damages for pain and suffering of such injured person shall 
not be allowed.”); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 377.34 (“In an action or proceeding by a 
decedent’s personal representative or successor in interest on the decedent’s cause of 
action, the damages recoverable are limited to the loss or damage that the decedent 
sustained or incurred before death, including any penalties or punitive or exemplary 
damages that the decedent would have been entitled to recover had the decedent lived, and
do not include damages for pain, suffering, or disfigurement.”); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-20-
101 (2012) (“[T]he damages recoverable after the death of the person in whose favor 
such action has accrued shall be limited to loss of earnings and expenses sustained or 
incurred prior to death and shall not include damages for pain, suffering, or
disfigurement . . . .”).
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by plaintiffs in a persistent vegetative state.35  Some states allow for the
recovery of loss of enjoyment of life damages separate from pain and
suffering under the survival statute.36  If courts allow the trier of fact to
consider the recovery of hedonic damages as a separate element of
damages, there seems to be a guarantee that the general damages award
will consider hedonic damages.37  Some state survival statutes allow only 
for the recovery of hedonic damages to the extent that they are part of 
the pain and suffering award.38  Those states limit the award to the pain 
and suffering experienced by the victim after the injury and before death.39 
In addition to the issue regarding loss of enjoyment of life as a separate
element of pain and suffering damages, the companion issue of whether
hedonic damages are recoverable by comatose plaintiffs is present in
survival actions.40 
B. Damages Recoverable in Personal Injury Actions 
A tort is a civil wrong—other than breach of contract—that causes an
injury that the judicial system can remedy,41 most often through an
35. See 1 JEROME H. NATES ET AL., DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS § 8.04 (Matthew 
Bender ed. 2012); 1 JACOB A. STEIN, STEIN ON PERSONAL INJURY DAMAGES TREATISE 
§ 3:65 (3d ed. 1997).
36. See Mariner v. Marsden, 610 P.2d 6, 12 (Wyo. 1980) (holding that “loss of
enjoyment of life is a compensable damage” in a survival action and  “the fact finder . . . 
may either make a separate award for loss of enjoyment of life or take into consideration 
the loss of enjoyment of life in arriving at the total general damages”).
37. See 1 STEIN, supra note 35, § 3:65. 
38. See, e.g., Sterner v. Wesley Coll., Inc., 747 F. Supp. 263, 273 (D. Del. 1990)
(applying Delaware law).  An Arizona court also held that loss of enjoyment of life damages 
are part of pain and suffering and therefore unrecoverable under a survival statute that 
excludes damages for pain and suffering.  See Quintero v. Rodgers, 212 P.3d 874, 877
(Ariz. Ct. App. 2009). 
39. See Sterner, 747 F. Supp. at 273 (holding that “[p]laintiffs may offer evidence 
of the hedonic value of the decedent’s life only to the extent that it is relevant as a 
measure of the decedent’s pain and suffering in the time between the start of the fire in
Williams Hall and decedent’s death”).  In Sterner v. Wesley College, Inc., one student was
killed and one student was injured when a dorm caught fire at Wesley College.  Id. at 
265. The district court allowed for the recovery of hedonic damages incurred while the 
students were caught in the burning building. Id. at 273. However, the district court
noted that because the period during which the students may have suffered was so brief,
the defendants could present evidence that expert testimony on hedonic damages “would
not be an aid to the jury in assessing the pain and suffering incurred by the decedent.” 
Id.
40. See 1 STEIN, supra note 35, § 3:65.  A New Jersey court allowed for the recovery 
of loss of enjoyment of life damages in a survival action when the plaintiff was in a
persistent vegetative state prior to the time of death. See Eyoma v. Falco, 589 A.2d 653, 662
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991). 
41. See F. Patrick Hubbard, The Nature and Impact of the “Tort Reform” Movement, 
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award of damages.42  A party has a right to the recovery of an element of
damages “if the element is reasonable and finds support in the pleadings 
and evidence.”43  The two most common explanations for tort theory lie
in the law and economics and corrective justice theories.44  Law and 
economics theory relies upon the concept of “economic efficiency”45 and 
seeks to correct social costs by imposing liability rules that will force people 
in society “to bear the cost of their activities to others.”46  Alternatively, 
corrective justice seeks to “apportion[] moral responsibility”47 by “focus[ing]
on the wrongs done in each individual case.”48  Corrective justice calls 
for the rectification of the equilibrium that exists in society, which is 
most often achieved through monetary compensation.49  Most often the 
act for which a civil action will lie except one involving a breach of contract.”  WEBSTER’S 
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED 2413 
(2002).
42. See Hubbard, supra note 41, at 439. 
43. Carleton R. Cramer, Comment, Loss of Enjoyment of Life as a Separate 
Element of Damages, 12 PAC. L.J. 965, 976 (1981).  In personal injury actions, a plaintiff is
entitled to damages for “all of the natural and proximate consequences of a tortfeasor’s
wrongful act or omission,” even if the injury “was not contemplated or foreseen.” 
Annotation, Loss of Enjoyment of Life as a Distinct Element or Factor in Awarding 
Damages for Bodily Injury, 34 A.L.R. 4TH 293, 297 (1984) [hereinafter Loss of Enjoyment of
Life as a Distinct Element].
44. See Benjamin C. Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse in the Law of Torts, 
51 VAND. L. REV. 1, 4 (1998). A third common explanation for tort law is based upon a 
concept of social justice.  See Michael L. Rustad, Torts as Public Wrongs, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 
433, 459–60 (2011).  Social justice theorists believe tort law should “vindicate public wrongs
and hold corporate wrongdoers accountable.”  Id. at 460. The theory differs greatly from 
corrective justice in that it goes beyond the wrong done to the individual plaintiff and attempts
to serve a broader public purpose.  Id. at 461. 
45. Rustad, supra note 44, at 457. 
46. Zipursky, supra note 44, at 45–46.  Law and economics theorists hope to 
“internalize” the externalities produced when a person makes a decision that economically
affects another. Id. at 46. The law and economics theory considers efficiency to be the
general goal of tort law, “without necessarily arguing that efficiency should be the goal of the
legal system.”  Rustad, supra note 44, at 457 (quoting FRANK H. STEPHEN, THE ECONOMICS OF
THE LAW 129 (1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
47. Zipursky, supra note 44, at 4. 
48. Rustad, supra note 44, at 464.  In order for defendants to be liable for wrongs,
their actions must injure another’s “interest that has the status of a right.”  Id. at 463–64
(quoting Ernest J. Weinrib, Corrective Justice in a Nutshell, 52 U. TORONTO L.J. 349, 352
(2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
49. See id. at 463.  Monetary compensation is considered the “functional equivalent of












     
 
   
 
 
   





    
 









   
  
wrongdoer must pay enough compensatory damages to the plaintiff in 
order to return the plaintiff to the status quo ante.50 
By imposing the liability of paying compensatory damages on the
defendant, the tort system compels due care and deters wrongdoing.51 
Compensatory damages are composed of three separate types of damages:
“(1) loss of earning capacity; (2) out-of-pocket expenses; and (3) pain 
and suffering.”52  Loss of earning capacity damages are awarded when a 
“person’s future employability has been adversely affected.”53  Courts 
measure earning capacity damages by calculating the difference between
the plaintiff’s ability to earn money before and after the wrong occurred.54 
Out-of-pocket expenses encompass funds spent in response to an injury, 
including medical expenses.55  The third category covers physical pain 
and suffering.56  Courts consider pain and suffering to be “the physiological
response by the injured person to a corporal injury.”57 Pain and suffering is
a subjective category of damages and “is evidenced exclusively by the 
plaintiff’s subjective complaints.”58  It is universally accepted that pain 
and suffering damages are recoverable in personal injury actions.59 
Some courts also recognize a fourth type of compensatory damages: 
those for loss of enjoyment of life.60  Loss of enjoyment of life damages 
50. See Hubbard, supra note 41, at 440. 
51. See id. at 445–56. 
52. Cramer, supra note 43, at 965–66 (citing D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW 
OF REMEDIES, Damages for Personal Injury § 8.1, at 540 (1973)). 
53. 9 LOUIS R. FRUMER & MELVIN I. FRIEDMAN, PERSONAL INJURY: ACTIONS, 
DEFENSES, DAMAGES § 43.08 (Matthew Bender rev. ed. 2012). 
54. See id.  Like many other types of damages, there is no set manner in which to 
measure loss of earning capacity.  Id.  The court can consider several factors, including
“the plaintiff’s age, life expectancy, work-life expectancy, health habits, occupation, talents,
skill, experience, training, and industry.”  Id.  The plaintiff’s recovery need not be restricted to
the amount of earnings made prior to the injury. Id.  Proof of prior earnings is one factor 
to be considered but is not controlling.  See id.; see also Sallis v. Lamansky, 420 N.W.2d 
795, 798 (Iowa 1988) (noting that the loss of the ability to earn money is the compensable
damage, not the actual loss of earnings). 
55. Cramer, supra note 43, at 966. 
56. Id. 
57. See 9 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 53, § 43.06. 
58. Braun v. Edelstein, 554 A.2d 1102, 1104 (Conn. App. Ct. 1989) (quoting Delott v.
Roraback, 426 A.2d 791, 793 (Conn. App. Ct. 1980)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
59. See Fantozzi v. Sandusky Cement Prods. Co., 597 N.E.2d 474, 484 (Ohio 1992). 
“In addition to compensation for the physical pain, the jury is permitted to award 
compensation for the mental suffering endured.”  Id.
60. Cramer, supra note 43, at 966.  Hedonic damages became more popular in the 
1980s. See Scott F. Gibson & Jerome M. Staller, Is the Hedonic Damages Party Almost
Over?, FOR THE DEFENSE, Aug. 1997, at 35, 35, available at http://www.cfes.com/publications/
Hedonic_Damages.htm.  The increase in hedonic damage awards was largely attributable to
the ability the category had for greatly increasing damage awards.  Id. Expert witness 
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first became an available remedy in personal injury actions in the 1890s.61 
Some courts consider these hedonic damages the equivalent of pain and 
suffering damages for two reasons: first, both hedonic damages and pain
and suffering damages arise under similar circumstances, and second, 
both are intangible in nature.62 
Once the court establishes that a type of damages is available to a
plaintiff, the finder of fact must determine the amount of the award.63 
Generally speaking, there is no set formula that can be used to determine
punitive damages in any given case.64  The determination of the amount
of pain and suffering damages is no easier to determine, and juries have
used several different methods to come up with award figures, including
such random methods as splitting the difference between the plaintiff’s 
and the defendant’s suggested figures, doubling the defendant’s suggested 
amount, and multiplying the amount of medical expenses by three.65 
Because the assessment of pain and suffering is a matter solely for the 
trier of fact, there is “no substitute for simple human evaluation.”66 
Moreover, the calculation of hedonic damages poses just as complicated
of a problem as the computation of pain and suffering or punitive
“loss of joy” taken from the overall value of the person’s life, which is usually somewhere 
between $1 million and $8 million. Id.
61. Cramer, supra note 43, at 965.  Cramer based this contention on his inability 
to find any cases prior to the 1890s in which loss of enjoyment of life was considered. 
Id. at 965 n.3.
62. Id. at 973. 
63. See Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Excessiveness or Adequacy of Damages
Awarded for Injuries to Head or Brain, 50 A.L.R. 5TH 1, 1 (1997) (“The personal injury
case is certainly not over when liability is established or admitted, but the plaintiff must
then prove the proper amount of damages to be awarded.”); Loss of Enjoyment of Life as 
a Distinct Element, supra note 43, at 297. 
64. See Warhurst v. White, 838 S.W.2d 350, 352 (Ark. 1992).  “Such damages
constitute a penalty and must be sufficient not only to deter similar conduct on the part of
the same tortfeasor, but they must be sufficient to deter any others who might engage in 
similar conduct.” Id. (citing Matthews v. Rodgers, 651 S.W.2d 453, 458 (Ark. 1983)).
The amount of actual damages and the defendant’s financial wealth are two factors to be
considered in determining the proper amount of punitive damages.  See id.
65. Mark Geistfeld, Placing a Price on Pain and Suffering: A Method for Helping 
Juries Determine Tort Damages for Nonmonetary Injuries, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 773, 784 
(1995) (quoting Neil Vidmar, Empirical Evidence on the Deep Pockets Hypothesis: Jury
Awards for Pain and Suffering in Medical Malpractice Cases, 43 DUKE L.J. 217, 254–55
(1993)).
66. Fantozzi v. Sandusky Cement Prods. Co., 597 N.E.2d 474, 482 (Ohio 1992)





      
   
 
 




   
 
      
  
  




   
 
    




















   
  
damages.67  Economists generally suggest that hedonic damages are
assessed based on the amount people are willing to pay to reduce the risk of
death.68 Other theorists argue that expert witnesses should present “hedonic
damages testimony,” which attempts to place a value on loss of enjoyment 
of life.69  The inconsistency in methods used to calculate noneconomic 
damages fosters a fear in courts and legislatures regarding excessive
damage awards.70 
67. See Gibson & Staller, supra note 60, at 35–38. 
68. See Ann Fisher et al., The Value of Reducing Risks of Death: A Note on New 
Evidence, 8 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 88, 88 (1989).  In order to illustrate this simple
“market theory,” one must look at the price people are willing to spend on safety.  See
MICHAEL L. BROOKSHIRE & STAN V. SMITH, ECONOMIC/HEDONIC DAMAGES: THE PRACTICE 
BOOK FOR PLAINTIFF AND DEFENSE ATTORNEYS app. 1, at 225–26 (1990); Gibson & 
Staller, supra note 60, at 36.  Smith and Brookshire ask one to assume that someone is 
willing to spend $700 on a safety device that will decrease the person’s likelihood of
death from 7 in 10,000 to 5 in 10,000. See  BROOKSHIRE & SMITH, supra, at 226.  The 
chance of dying is reduced by 2/10,000, making it “one chance in 5,000 at a cost of 
$700.” Gibson & Staller, supra note 60, at 36 (quoting BROOKSHIRE & SMITH, supra, at 
226) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Therefore, this person values his life at $3.5
million. Id. (quoting BROOKSHIRE & SMITH, supra, at 226). 
69. See Thomas R. Ireland, The Last of Hedonic Damages: Nevada, New Mexico, 
and Running a Bluff, 16 J. LEGAL ECON. 91, 91 (2009).  One survey of studies “puts the 
value of life’s enjoyment at between $1.5 and $3.5 million.”  Gibson & Staller, supra note 
60, at 36 (citing Ted R. Miller, The Plausible Range for the Value of Life—Red Herrings 
Among the Mackerel, 3 J. FORENSIC ECON. 17, 32–33 (1990)). The studies that Miller
analyzed examine “the relationship between expenditures and risk—what economists call
willingness-to-pay.”  Id. (citing Miller, supra, at 17).  The admittance of expert witness 
testimony regarding the hedonic value of life is governed by the rules of evidence 
applicable to the court in which the case is heard.  See  FED. R. EVID. 702; CAL. EVID. 
CODE § 801 (West 2013).  Federal Rule of Evidence 702 allows for the use of expert 
witness testimony if
(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; (b) the
testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; (c) the testimony is the product
of reliable principles and methods; and (d) the expert has reliably applied the 
principles and methods to the facts of the case. 
FED. R. EVID. 702. Under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the scientific 
evidence used by expert witnesses need not be that of “general acceptance.”  509 U.S.
579, 588–89 (1993).  However, the trial judge “must ensure that any and all scientific 
testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable.”  Id. at 589. Gibson
and Staller, in their article, Is the Hedonic Damages Party Almost Over?, argue that a 
study examining expert testimony about the value of “enjoyment of life” shows that “hedonic
testimony will not meet the guidelines” established in Daubert. Gibson & Staller, supra
note 60, at 35. 
70. See Gibson & Staller, supra note 60, at 36 (“While the hedonic-damages experts
are unanimously vague as to how they arrive at the value of life, the values they put on 
the board in court are anything but vague.  Various hedonic-damages specialists have
placed the value of life at between $1 million and more than $8 million.”); see also
David Baldus et al., Improving Judicial Oversight of Jury Damages Assessments: 





























    
     
   
[VOL. 50:  721, 2013] Joyless Life and Lifeless Joy 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
C. The Effects of Tort Reform on Damages for Personal Injuries 
Courts and legislatures have been concerned that damage awards— 
specifically those for nonpecuniary losses—are difficult to measure and
can be excessive.71  Two very significant tort reform movements reflected 
this concern: the workers’ compensation movement and the no-fault 
automobile accident system.72  The workers’ compensation movement 
abolished employer tort liability and created a system in which workers’ 
compensation handled employees’ work-related injuries.73  Under  the  
no-fault system, the right to recovery exists no matter who is at fault, 
abolishing pain and suffering expenses while guaranteeing out-of-pocket 
medical expenses.74  Courts continue to discuss and even extend the
reform concepts adopted in those movements to other tort areas.75  One
such area involves restrictions on both punitive damages and pain and 
suffering damages, fueled by the continued increase in tort damage
awards.76  The tort reform movement included pain and suffering damages
Harms and Punitive Damages, 80 IOWA L. REV. 1109, 1115 (1995) (arguing that inconsistent 
and excessive damage awards are “inherent in a system that allocates responsibility for 
the valuation and assessment of awards to inexperienced jurors who are asked to make 
individualized damage assessments without reference to any external standards defining
the appropriate award level”). 
71. See Hubbard, supra note 41, at 493 (“[D]amages for noneconomic injuries are
said to be ‘erratic’ and ‘excessive’ because juries are too generous in awarding noneconomic 
damages based on sympathy for a plaintiff elicited by skillful plaintiffs’ attorneys.”).
“Reservations about compensating for intangible loss are not new.  There has been long-
standing criticism about the seemingly insurmountable problem of translating suffering 
into dollar-and-cents terms. Moreover, pain and suffering is subjective in the added sense that
it varies tremendously from one individual to another.”  9 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra
note 53, app. N. 
72. See Hubbard, supra note 41, at 441–42.  The no-fault system is characterized
by the following six elements: (1) right to recovery regardless of fault; (2) inapplicability
of the collateral source rule; (3) abolishment of pain and suffering; (4) guaranteed
recovery of out-of-pocket medical costs and recovery of loss of earnings; (5) barring of 
suits against the manufacturer; and (6) tort system returns when damages reach a certain 
level or the injury is of a certain type.  See 9 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 53, app.
G.
73. See Hubbard, supra note 41, at 441. 
74. 9 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 53, app. G. 
75. See id. app. N.  “The question now arises whether such wholesale reform 
ought to be adopted either (1) system-wide, (2) in selected areas of high-risk activity, or
(3) for a category of cases involving seriously disabled accident victims.” Id.
76. See Developments in the Law—The Civil Jury, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1408, 
1515–16 (1997). The RAND Institute for Civil Justice published a series of reports on 








   
    




      
       
     
 
   
  
 




    
 










because courts considered compensatory awards to be speculative, of 
little compensatory consequence, and of great variation from case to
case.77  Courts have responded to the excessiveness of pain and suffering
awards in a variety of ways, including capping the recoverable amount 
and making greater use of remittitur or additur.78  In using remittitur, the
court gives the plaintiff the option of accepting a lower amount of damages 
than the jury awarded; if the plaintiff declines, the court will order a new 
trial.79  In addition, the American Bar Association (ABA) has suggested 
ERIK MOLLER, INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, TRENDS IN PUNITIVE DAMAGES: PRELIMINARY 
DATA FROM COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS AND SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA (1995); MARK 
PETERSON ET AL., INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, PUNITIVE DAMAGES: EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
(1987). In a report published in 1986, the institute analyzed data from Cook County,
Illinois and San Francisco, California.  See RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, AN OVERVIEW 
OF THE FIRST SIX PROGRAM YEARS, APRIL 1980–MARCH 1986, at 3–4 (1986).  The data 
showed a 400% increase in the average monetary damage awards between 1960 and 1985.
Id. at 3.  This increase reflects the growth of significantly large damage awards. Id. at 3.
During the 1960s, only 0.3% of awards were for $1 million or more. Id. at 4. By the 1980s, 
million dollar awards constituted almost two-thirds of the damage awards in San
Francisco and Cook County. Id.
77. See 9 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 53, app. N. 
78. In California, courts cap the recovery of noneconomic losses in medical 
malpractice actions at $250,000. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2 (a)-(b) (West 1997) (“In
any action for injury against a health care provider based on professional negligence, the 
injured plaintiff shall be entitled to recover noneconomic losses to compensate for pain, 
suffering, inconvenience, physical impairment, disfigurement and other nonpecuniary
damage. In no action shall the amount of damages for noneconomic losses exceed two 
hundred fifty thousand dollars . . . .”). “[T]rial and appellate courts should make greater
use of the power of remittitur or additur with reference to verdicts which are either so 
excessive or inadequate as to be clearly disproportionate to community expectations by
setting aside such verdicts unless the affected parties agree to the modification.” 
9 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 53, app. N; see also Korman v. Pub. Serv. Truck
Renting Inc., 497 N.Y.S.2d 480, 481 (App. Div. 1986) (upholding the trial judge’s 
decision to adjust the jury’s verdict for conscious pain and suffering from $500,000 to
$50,000).
79. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1409 (9th ed. 2009). In Dimick v. Schiedt, the 
Supreme Court upheld the use of remittitur.  293 U.S. 474, 484–85 (1935). The Court
noted that in order to preserve the original meaning of the Seventh Amendment, it must 
follow the common law rules established at the time of the adoption of the amendment.
See id. at 476. The common law rules in 1791 prohibited courts from increasing damage 
awards but did not forbid the decrease of awards.  Id. at 482.  Therefore, the legislators
that passed the Seventh Amendment intended for the allowance of remittitur. See id. at 
488. Despite the Supreme Court’s acceptance of remittitur, a few courts continue to 
question its constitutionality. See, e.g., Bonura v. Sea Land Serv., Inc., 505 F.2d 665, 
669 (5th Cir. 1974) (“A district judge’s discretion as to remittitur is circumscribed by the 
Seventh Amendment: He must not substitute his judgment of damages for that of the 
jury.”).  The Supreme Court of Missouri went as far as abolishing the use of remittitur
altogether at one point, claiming that it is an “invasion of the jury’s function by the trial
judge.” Firestone v. Crown Ctr. Redevelopment Corp., 693 S.W.2d 99, 110 (Mo. 1985)
(en banc).  In contrast to remittitur, some courts also use additur to increase the damage 
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the creation of tort award commissions to review tort awards from the
preceding year.80 
Because the purpose of tort law is to compensate the victim,81 the tort
reform movement also continues to focus on punitive damages.82 Tort 
law accepts the awarding of punitive damages for intentional wrongdoing.83 
In recent years, many courts have incorrectly classified situations as 
“intentional,” thereby allowing for punitive damage awards.84  In response 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 44 (9th ed. 2009).  Additur is prohibited in federal courts
because of its inconsistency with the Seventh Amendment of the United States Constitution. 
See U.S. CONST. amend. VII (“In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy 
shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried
by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to
the rules of the common law.”).  For example, in Davis v. Naviera Aznar, the United 
States District Court for the District of Maryland deemed a third party defendant’s motion to
modify the judgment and add an award for attorneys’ fees as “tantamount to an additur” 
and therefore denied the relief sought.  See 37 F.R.D. 223, 224–26 (D. Md. 1965).  However,
some state courts do allow for additur. See LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 1814 (2003)
(“If the trial court is of the opinion that the verdict is so excessive or inadequate that a
new trial should be granted for that reason only, it may indicate to the party or his attorney
within what time he may enter a remittitur or additur.”); MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-55 
(West 2008) (“The supreme court or any other court of record in a case in which money
damages were awarded may overrule a motion for new trial . . . upon condition of an
additur or remittitur, if the court finds that the damages are excessive or inadequate for
the reason that the jury or trier of the facts was influenced by bias, prejudice, or passion,
or that the damages awarded were contrary to the overwhelming weight of credible 
evidence.”).
80. 9 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 53, app. N.  The ABA also suggested that
courts provide juries with more guidance on the “appropriate range of damages to be 
awarded for pain and suffering in a particular case.” Id.
81. “It is elementary that the purpose of awarding tort damages is to compensate
the wronged party for the actual loss he or she has sustained.”  McDougald v. Garber, 
536 N.E.2d 372, 377 (N.Y. 1989) (Titone, J., dissenting). 
82. 9 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 53, app. N. “Since the main purpose of
tort law is to provide compensation to injury victims rather than vindicate a public sense 
of indignation, punitive damages have always been somewhat of an anomaly in the tort 
system.” Id.
83. See id. Two theories support the awarding of punitive damages for intentional
misconduct: (1) punitive damages express societal outrage and “assure the appropriate 
deterrent effect in cases where a defendant’s conduct is outside the bounds of civilized
behavior,” and (2) punitive damages ensure “a measure of punishment for essentially
private unlawful conduct that is commensurate with the antisocial nature of the act.”  Id.
84. See id. 
[T]he judicial willingness to allow punitive damage awards in cases involving 
egregious conduct falling short of intentional wrongdoing has increasingly




























   
 
 
    
 
  
     
 
to this misclassification, many states have enacted legislation narrowly 
defining punitive damages or specifically identifying the situations in
which they are allowed.85  The ABA recommends that courts narrowly
employ punitive damage awards and limit them to situations in which 
the defendant’s action is indicative of a great indifference to the safety of
others.86 
The fear of excessive noneconomic damages is the likely culprit behind 
the movement in several states toward not recognizing an unconscious 
plaintiff’s right to hedonic damages.  Many courts even consider an award 
of hedonic damages to those in a persistent vegetative state as beyond 
compensatory and in fact punitive in nature.87  However, many of the
basic arguments for tort damages made by both courts and scholars refute
this view and call for awarding loss of enjoyment of life damages, regardless 
of the state of consciousness of the plaintiff.88  Loss of enjoyment of life
is an objective fact that should not be contingent upon a plaintiff’s ability
to comprehend the degree of impairment.89 In addition, the argument that 
hedonic damages are too speculative and difficult to measure is also
applicable to several other widely accepted damages, including pain and 
suffering and emotional distress.90  Perhaps the most obvious and strongest 
argument for awarding hedonic damages to plaintiffs in a persistent 
misconduct that is either clearly malicious or at least borders on intentional 
wrongdoing—might be exceeded in some cases. 
Id.
85. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294 (West 2013) (“In an action for the breach of
an obligation not arising from contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing 
evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, 
in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by
way of punishing the defendant.”); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15–5.14 (West 2000) (limiting 
the amount of punitive damages for which the defendant is liable to “five times the liability of 
that defendant for compensatory damages or $350,000, whichever is greater”); Johnson v. 
Douglas, 723 N.Y.S.2d 627, 628 (App. Div. 2001) (noting that “[p]unitive damages are 
only allowed to vindicate public rights and not private wrongs”). 
86. 9 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 53, app. N. 
87. See, e.g., McDougald v. Garber, 536 N.E.2d 372, 374–75 (N.Y. 1989).  The 
McDougald court determined that because the awarding of nonpecuniary damages was 
simply indulging the “legal fiction” of being able to compensate a plaintiff monetarily
for a noneconomic loss, it was not willing to indulge that fiction when the plaintiff was 
unconscious and unable to enjoy the award of money damages. Id.
88. See, e.g., Holston v. Sisters of the Third Order of St. Francis, 618 N.E.2d 334, 
345–46 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993); Eyoma v. Falco, 589 A.2d 653, 658–62 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1991); Flannery v. United States (Flannery I), 297 S.E.2d 433, 438–39 (W. Va. 1982). 
89. See Rufino v. United States, 829 F.2d 354, 361 (2d Cir. 1987).  The loss of 
enjoyment of life is “to be assessed objectively, that is, by the difference between the
injured plaintiff’s current capacity and those which existed before the injury.” Id.
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vegetative state is the concept that a plaintiff should not receive a smaller
award for greater injury.91 
III. CURRENT GAPS IN THE LAW 
As the law currently stands, when a plaintiff in a persistent vegetative
state files a lawsuit for personal injury damages, the court will likely be 
faced with an issue of first impression.92  Several jurisdictions will be 
confronted with two new issues: first, whether to separate hedonic damages
from pain and suffering damages, and second, what damages are recoverable
by a plaintiff in a persistent vegetative state.93 
A. Why Is This an Issue? 
Nonpecuniary damages play a special role in personal injury litigation.94 
By compensating the victim for the physical and emotional effects of an
injury, nonpecuniary damages rest on the belief that money damages 
attempt to compensate for the injury a person sustained from another’s
wrong.95  Although money may not cure injuries or stop pain, awarding
damages is the best way for society to right a wrong.96  In addition, “life 
may be priceless and irreplaceable, but its value can be estimated with a
reasonable degree of economic certainty so that fair compensation for
its loss can be determined.”97  Because nonpecuniary damages do not
compensate for economic losses, trial courts struggle with determining
91. See Fla. Patient’s Comp. Fund v. Von Stetina, 474 So. 2d 783, 792–93 (Fla.
1985) (Overton, J., dissenting). A plaintiff who is in a persistent vegetative state should 
not be precluded from recovering an item of damages that a less severely injured person 
can recover. See id.
92. See infra Part III.A. 
93. See infra Part III.B–C. 
94. See Loss of Enjoyment of Life as a Distinct Element, supra note 43, at 69 
(Supp. 2012). Nonpecuniary damages are “those damages awarded to compensate an 
injured person for the physical and emotional consequences of the injury, such as pain
and suffering and the loss of ability to engage in certain activities.” McDougald v. Garber,
536 N.E.2d 372, 373 (N.Y. 1989). 
95. See McDougald, 536 N.E.2d at 374–75.  “There is no exact standard by which 
damages can be measured in personal injury cases, because of the lack of equivalence 
between money and pain and suffering, fright, or humiliation, but money nevertheless is 
awarded as ‘compensation.’” Loss of Enjoyment of Life as a Distinct Element, supra note 43, 
at 297. 
96.  McDougald, 536 N.E.2d at 375. 
97. Nicholson, supra note 20, at 255–56 (quoting BROOKSHIRE & SMITH, supra
note 68, at 161) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
737
 
   































how much a plaintiff’s pain and suffering or loss of joy is worth
monetarily.98 Despite this difficulty and the important role damages play
in remedies for torts, no general consensus exists on whether unconscious 
plaintiffs can recover loss of enjoyment of life damages.99  The type of 
damages recognized in a particular jurisdiction depends upon whether
the court views loss of enjoyment of life damages as separate from other 
compensatory damages, such as those for pain and suffering or permanent 
disability.100  The courts that have considered this dilemma usually discuss
the different categories of compensatory damages in general, as well as 
the recovery of compensatory damages by unconscious plaintiffs
specifically.101  The courts that have considered loss of enjoyment of 
life damages and plaintiffs in a persistent vegetative state fall into three 
general categories: (1) those that do not allow for any recovery of loss of
enjoyment of life damages in any situation, whether or not the plaintiff is
in a persistent vegetative state;102 (2) those that consider loss of enjoyment 
98. See Flannery v. United States (Flannery I), 297 S.E.2d 433, 435 (W. Va. 1982).
Compensatory damages “consist[] of intangible damages since they are ‘unliquidated’ in 
the sense that there is no precise monetary calculation that can be used to determine the
amount of the loss.”  Id.
99. See Eyoma v. Falco, 589 A.2d 653, 658–59 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991)
(“[T]he issue of damages for loss of enjoyment of life has generated divergence of opinion
among legal scholars.”); infra Part III.C.1.
100.  Fantozzi v. Sandusky Cement Prods. Co., 597 N.E.2d 474, 483 (Ohio 1992). 
101. See, e.g., Gregory v. Carey, 791 P.2d 1329, 1336 (Kan. 1990) (“[L]oss of
enjoyment of the pleasurable things in life is inextricably included within the more 
traditional areas of damages for disability and pain and suffering.”); Eyoma, 589 A.2d at 
658 (“[L]oss of enjoyment of life is a separate and distinct item of damages . . . .”);
McDougald, 536 N.E.2d at 377 (“[No] salutary purpose would be served by having the 
jury make separate awards for pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life.”).
102. See Pamela J. Hermes,  Loss of Enjoyment of Life—Duplication of Damages 
Versus Full Compensation, 63 N.D. L. REV. 561, 565 (1987). In City of Columbus v. 
Strassner, the Supreme Court of Indiana denied the recovery of loss of enjoyment of life 
damages to a plaintiff who was injured while walking on the city’s sidewalk because
measuring the damages would have been “an insuperable difficulty.”  25 N.E. 65, 67 
(Ind. 1890). Similarly, in Locke v. International & Great Northern Railroad, the Court 
of Civil Appeals of Texas denied the recovery of hedonic damages because of the 
uncertainty surrounding how to calculate them.  60 S.W. 314, 316 (Tex. App. 1901).  The 
Kansas Supreme Court also denied the recovery of loss of enjoyment of life damages in 
Hogan v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co., noting that a plaintiff’s loss from the 
inability to play the violin was too speculative and therefore unrecoverable.  85 P.2d 28, 
33–34 (Kan. 1938).  The Hogan court recognized that several other cases have allowed for 
the recovery of hedonic damages; however, the Hogan court declined to follow these 
cases.  Id. at 33; see also Hermes, supra, at 566 n.21 (discussing the Hogan decision).  It 
is important to note that the cases that rejected the recovery of hedonic damages are 
older and are all based on the belief that calculating hedonic damages “would be too vague or 
speculative.”  Hermes, supra, at 565–66. Most jurisdictions have rejected this contention,
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of life a component of pain and suffering or disability damages;103 and 
(3) those that consider loss of enjoyment of life as its own separate type
of damages.104 This Comment focuses on the last two categories.105 
B. Conflicting Approaches to the Awarding of Compensatory Damages 
Several states have yet to consider whether hedonic damages are a 
separate type of damages from pain and suffering damages.106  This gap
in the law exists due to a severe lack of clarity in the definitions of the 
different types of damages that courts give in jury instructions.107  The 
following analysis focuses on some of the states that have considered
this issue. 
speculative than th[ose] for other items of general damages such as pain and suffering or
mental anguish.” Id. at 568. 
103. See Loth v. Truck-A-Way Corp., 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d 571, 575 (Ct. App. 1998)
(holding that hedonic damages are “one component of a general damage award for pain
and suffering”).  In Willinger v. Mercy Catholic Medical Center, the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania compared the recovery of a separate element of damages for “loss of life’s 
pleasures” with the recovery of damages for “loss of life itself,” which was never 
allowed in Pennsylvania.  See 393 A.2d 1188, 1191 (Pa. 1978).  The Willinger court 
allowed for the recovery of hedonic damages only as a portion of pain and suffering.  Id.
The courts that consider hedonic damages to be only one portion of a larger award for 
pain and suffering usually base this contention on the rationale that they are
preventing “an impermissible duplication” of damages. See Hermes, supra note 102, at 
569; see also Poyzer v. McGraw, 360 N.W.2d 748, 753 (Iowa 1985) (“It would be
plainly duplicative to allow a separate award for loss of enjoyment of life.”). 
104. See Hermes, supra note 102, at 576; infra Part III.B.2.  Courts that support the
separation of loss of enjoyment of life damages from pain and suffering usually allow for
a separate jury instruction on hedonic damages.  See Hermes, supra note 102, at 576.  In 
District of Columbia v. Woodbury, the Supreme Court of the United States noted that
“[a]ll evidence, tending to show the character of his ordinary pursuits, and the extent to 
which the injury complained of prevented him from following those pursuits, [is] 
pertinent to the issue.”  136 U.S. 450, 459 (1890). 
105. At this point, it is generally accepted that loss of enjoyment of life damages 
should be recoverable or considered to some extent in personal injury suits.  See Hermes, 
supra note 102, at 568 (“[I]n most modern cases, regardless of whether loss of 
enjoyment of life is considered a separate element of damages or a component of some
other element of damages, evidence of such alleged losses may be introduced and argued
to the jury . . . .”). 
106. See Loss of Enjoyment of Life as a Distinct Element, supra note 43, at 295–96. 
107. Edith Greene & Brian Bornstein, Precious Little Guidance: Jury Instruction on
Damage Awards, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 743, 745 (2000) (“Jury instructions on
damage awards are notoriously vague and ambiguous.”); Cramer, supra note 43, at 972.
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1. Loss of Enjoyment of Life as an Element of Pain and Suffering 
Some courts consider loss of enjoyment of life damages to be but one 
aspect of pain and suffering damages.108  In Loth v. Truck-A-Way Corp., 
the California Court of Appeal deemed loss of enjoyment of life damages to
be one component of the general damage award for pain and suffering.109 
The court made this decision based on the belief that pain and suffering 
includes “physical impairment which limits the plaintiff’s capacity to 
share in the amenities of life.”110  The Loth court stated that California 
courts achieve a result consistent with the “‘enjoyment of life’ rubric” 
without actually following it.111  This point is based on the fact that 
California does not preclude plaintiffs’ attorneys from arguing loss of 
108. See, e.g., Loth, 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 571; Leiker v. Gafford, 778 P.2d 823 (Kan.
1989); McDougald v. Garber, 536 N.E.2d 372 (N.Y. 1989). In Leiker, the Supreme 
Court of Kansas held that “loss of enjoyment of the pleasurable things in life is
inextricably included within the more traditional areas of damages for disability and pain
and suffering.”  778 P.2d at 835.  The court based its decision on the contention that the
recovery of loss of enjoyment of life damages separate from damages for pain and
suffering would cause a “duplication or overlapping of damages.”  Id. The Leiker court 
also took into account the “slight majority” of cases that have held in this manner and the 
wording of the Kansas statute on itemized verdicts in personal injury actions.  Id.
Kansas Statutes Annotated section 60-249a states that if the trier of fact finds for the 
plaintiff in an action for damages for personal injury, the trier of fact must itemize
the amounts awarded for the following items of damage, subject to the provisions 
of subsection (a): (1) Noneconomic injuries and losses, as follows: (A) Pain 
and suffering, (B) disability, (C) disfigurement, and any accompanying mental
anguish; (2) reasonable expenses of necessary medical care, hospitalization
and treatment received; and (3) economic injuries and losses other than those 
itemized under subsection (b)(2). 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-249a (2008).  The Leiker court made sure to clarify that loss of 
enjoyment of life damages can still be taken into account in the calculation of disability
and pain and suffering damages “and may certainly be argued by counsel to the jury.”  778
P.2d at 835. 
109. See Loth, 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 575.  In Loth, the plaintiff, who had been injured 
in a car accident with a 24-wheel truck, asked for both pain and suffering and loss of
enjoyment of life damages for the constant pain she experienced in her neck and back.
Id. at 573–74. The plaintiff’s injuries were so severe that the act of driving a car caused
her jaw to hurt, requiring her to drive with her mouth agape to prevent clenching. Id. at
574. 
110. Id. at 575 (quoting Huff v. Tracy, 129 Cal. Rptr. 551, 553 (Ct. App. 1976))
(internal quotation marks omitted).  In Huff v. Tracy, the defendant ran a red light and 
collided with the plaintiff’s automobile.  129 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 552.  The plaintiff suffered
from a severe tongue injury, which permanently impaired his sense of taste. Id. at 553. 
He requested that the court give the jury instructions on loss of enjoyment of life 
damages. Id.  The Court of Appeal refused to allow the separate instruction for hedonic 
damages, noting that attorneys in California are not precluded from arguing a loss of joy
but must include it in the award for pain and suffering damages. Id.  The Huff court was
concerned with “the possibility of double compensation” and believed the instruction for
pain and suffering damages was sufficient.  Id.
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enjoyment of life as an element of damages in personal injury cases.112 
In addition, “[d]amage for mental suffering supplies an analogue.”113  The 
Loth court rendered expert witness testimony on the value of hedonic 
damages inadmissible because of the lack of a definite method for
calculating pain and suffering damages.114 
In an effort to limit the amount of damages available to a personal 
injury plaintiff, New York decided to consider loss of enjoyment of life 
damages as only one element of the general award for pain and suffering.115 
In McDougald v. Garber, the Court of Appeals of New York discussed the
pain and suffering damages recoverable by a comatose plaintiff
and considered the term suffering to be all encompassing, allowing for 
the recovery of “the frustration and anguish caused by the inability to 
participate in activities that once brought pleasure,” in addition to the 
usual sensation of pain felt from an injury.116  Because the McDougald
court was concerned with increasing nonpecuniary damage awards
without “yield[ing] a more accurate evaluation of the compensation due 
to the plaintiff,” the court refused to separate the two types of damages.117 
The Court of Appeals of New York decided that larger compensatory
damage awards are not necessarily an indication that the award is more
112. Id.; see supra note 110. 
113. Loth, 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 575.
114. Id. at 578.  California courts allow for the use of expert witness testimony only if
the subject matter is “sufficiently beyond common experience that the opinion of an
expert would assist the trier of fact.”  CAL. EVID. CODE § 801 (West 2013).  The Loth court did
not believe that an expert witness’s testimony would be helpful for a jury because the 
value of life is not something measurable, unlike the value of “a stock, car, [or] home.” 
70 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 578. 
115. See McDougald v. Garber, 536 N.E.2d 372, 375 (N.Y. 1989). 
116. Id. at 376. The McDougald court acknowledged the fact that there are some
differences between the notions of pain and suffering damages and loss of enjoyment of
life damages. Id.  By limiting the term suffering to “the emotional response to the sensation of
pain, then the emotional response caused by the limitation of life’s activities may be
considered qualitatively different.”  Id.  The court rejected such a “limited” reading of 
suffering, mentioning the “[t]raditional[]” path taken by courts in giving the term a broad
meaning. Id.  California also considered loss of enjoyment of life to be part of pain and
suffering damages.  See Loth, 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 575 (“[P]ain and suffering . . . may include 
compensation for the plaintiff’s loss of enjoyment of life.  Loss of enjoyment of life, 
however, is only one component of a general damage award for pain and suffering.  It is 
not calculated as a separate award.”).
117. McDougald, 536 N.E.2d at 376.  The McDougald court pointed out that the 
fact that the plaintiff asked for two separate awards and the defendant opposed the 
























   
  
    
 
    
     
 
   
 
   




accurate.118  In addition to its concern with increased awards, the McDougald
court made note of the possibility that separate awards would lead to 
repetition.119  The rather “murky” manner in which nonpecuniary damages
are calculated—by “[t]ranslating human suffering into dollars and cents”
—led the McDougald court to hold that no “salutary purpose would be
served by having the jury make separate awards for pain and suffering 
and loss of enjoyment of life.”120 
2. Loss of Enjoyment of Life Separate from Pain and Suffering 
Few courts currently allow for the recovery of separate awards for
hedonic damages and pain and suffering damages.121  In  Fantozzi v. 
Sandusky Cement Products Co.,122 the question before the Ohio Supreme 
Court was whether jury instructions that directed separate elements of
damages for the “inability to perform usual activities,” the disability the 
plaintiff would experience in the future, and the pain and permanency of
the injury were proper.123  In making its decision, the Ohio Supreme Court 
first focused on the concept of pain and suffering damages.124  The court 
determined physical pain to be “the neurological response to physical
damage to the body”125 and suffering to be the “mental or emotional state
118. See id. at 376–77. 
119. Id. at 377. 
120. Id. at 376–77. The McDougald court went on to state that it was confident 
“that the trial advocate’s art is a sufficient guarantee that none of the plaintiff’s losses 
will be ignored by the jury.”  Id. at 377. The court held that the instructions given by the 
lower court regarding the separation of loss of enjoyment of life damages and pain and
suffering damages were incorrect and ordered a new trial on the issue of nonpecuniary
damages. Id.
 121. See Loss of Enjoyment of Life as a Distinct Element, supra note 43, at 297–98. 
122. 597 N.E.2d 474 (Ohio 1992).  In Fantozzi, the plaintiff was struck by a “warped”
chute being used by the defendant company to offload cement to a construction site.  Id.
at 476. The plaintiff filed a lawsuit “alleging reckless, gross, willful, wanton and negligent 
conduct by Sandusky Cement.”  Id. at 476–77.  The lower court awarded damages for 
past and future medical expenses, lost wages, pain and suffering, and loss of life’s enjoyment.
Id. at 477. 
123. Id. at 486–87.  Loss of enjoyment of life damages were already a type of damage
recognized in Ohio, so the Fantozzi court did not need to create a “new and additional
element” of damage to encompass the “claimed loss and resulting damage.”  Id. at 484. 
124. See id.  Pain and suffering is generally viewed as a “unitary concept.”  Id.  Courts 
have generally refrained from distinguishing between the concepts of pain and suffering. 
Id. (in bank) (quoting Capelouto v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 500 P.2d 880, 883 (Cal. 
1972)). Pain and suffering is now known to include “fright, nervousness, grief, anxiety,
worry, mortification, shock, humiliation, indignity, embarrassment, apprehension, terror or
ordeal.” Id. at 484–85 (quoting Capelouto, 500 P.2d at 883). 
125. Id. at 485.  Physical pain has been defined as “a more or less localized sensation of
discomfort, distress or agony resulting from the stimulation of specialized nerve endings.” 
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brought on by the plaintiff’s injury.”126  The Fantozzi court determined that
pain and suffering damages were distinguishable from damages for the 
impairment “of one’s physical capacity to enjoy the amenities of life.”127 
Because hedonic damages focus on the loss of the ability to experience 
“positive sensations of pleasure” and not the current or future suffering
the plaintiff experiences, hedonic damages represent “a loss of a positive 
experience rather than the infliction of a negative experience.”128  Based
on this distinction, the court concluded that damages that cover injuries 
affecting the ability to perform usual functions—including basic mechanical
and hedonic functions—are separate from other types of damages.129 
The court believed its conclusion was reasonable based on a number of
factors.130  First, because damage awards should restore plaintiffs to the
position they occupied prior to their injuries, allowing the recovery of 
hedonic damages separate from pain and suffering damage awards will 
help the jury take into account each separate type of injury, adding more 
“clarity and objectivity to this part of the jury determination.”131  Second, 
the separation of hedonic damages and pain and suffering damages will 
(1965) (quoting DORLAND’S MEDICAL DICTIONARY (24th ed. 1965)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
126. Fantozzi, 597 N.E.2d at 485.  This definition of suffering is quite general. Id.
Suffering can include a number of concepts and take many forms.  Id.  “Any definition
of suffering, although not definitive, may include a broad range of emotional responses 
which may occur in conjunction with the trauma and resultant physical injury and pain, 
or irrespective of any physical injury and pain.”  Id.  The California Supreme Court held
that mental suffering “constitutes an aggravation of damages when it naturally ensues
from the act complained of, and in this connection mental suffering includes nervousness, 
grief, anxiety, worry, shock, humiliation and indignity as well as physical pain.” Id. (quoting
Crisci v. Sec. Ins. Co. of New Haven, Conn., 426 P.2d 173, 178 (Cal. 1967)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  Pain is commonly characterized as “physiological,” whereas 
suffering is “psychological.”  Cramer, supra note 43, at 972.  “Whereas pain refers to the 
physical sensations resulting from the corporeal injury, suffering is concerned primarily
with the person’s emotional reaction to these sensations.”  Id.  Nevertheless, pain and 
suffering does not refer to the restrictions placed on a person’s life because of the 
person’s injury. Id.
 127. Fantozzi, 597 N.E.2d at 485. 
128. Id. at 486.  Hedonic damages refer to experiences that “are all positive sensations
of pleasure, the loss of which could provide a basis for an award of damages to the plaintiff in
varying degrees depending upon his involvement, as shown by the evidence.” Id.  The
mental suffering covered in pain and suffering damages, on the other hand, refers to 
“nervousness, grief, shock, anxiety, and so forth.”  Id.
 129. See id.  This position was furthered by the fact that Ohio jury instructions



























    













     
 
facilitate appellate review.132  Separate findings allow for the parties to
determine whether an appeal is proper and also allow for appellate courts to
better review the lower court’s findings.133  In addition, the Fantozzi court 
recognized the concern over duplicity in awards and thus called for more
specific jury instructions.134  By directing juries to award damages for 
loss of the ability to perform usual activities, thereby encompassing the 
permanency of the injury suffered, courts preclude juries from awarding 
additional damages for that same loss.135 
Loss of enjoyment of life damages need not be its own independent
category of damages to be considered separate from pain and suffering 
damages.136  By categorizing hedonic damages as a type of permanent
injury damages, West Virginia courts allow for hedonic damage recovery
132. Id.
 133. Id.  Appellate review of lower court decisions improves the trial process by
correcting errors and clarifying the law through “well-thought-out decisions.”  Irene M. 
Ten Cate, International Arbitration and the Ends of Appellate Review, 44 N.Y.U. J. INT’L 
L. & POL. 1109, 1143 (2012).  The threat of having an appellate court review a decision 
also gives trial courts an incentive to be “more diligent” in their decisionmaking.  Id.
 134. Fantozzi, 597 N.E.2d at 486. Several jurisdictions have declined to separate 
hedonic damages from pain and suffering damages for fear of duplication in awards.  See
Huff v. Tracy, 129 Cal. Rptr. 551, 553 (Ct. App. 1976) (noting that a separate jury instruction
for loss of enjoyment of life damages “only repeats what is effectively communicated by
the pain-and-suffering instruction”); Swiler v. Baker’s Super Market, Inc., 277 N.W.2d
697, 700 (Neb. 1979) (holding that a separate jury instruction for loss of enjoyment of 
life from pain and suffering would be redundant); Flannery v. United States (Flannery I), 
297 S.E.2d 433, 438 (W. Va. 1982) (holding that separate rewards for pain and suffering
and hedonic damages would be an “impermissible duplication of damages”).  In Flannery I, 
the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia noted that “there can be only one recovery of 
damages for one wrong or injury. . . . [T]he law does not permit a double satisfaction for 
a single injury.  A plaintiff may not recover damages twice for the same injury simply
because he has two legal theories.”  297 S.E.2d at 438 (quoting Harless v. First Nat’l
Bank, 289 S.E.2d 692, 705 (W. Va. 1982)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
135. Fantozzi, 597 N.E.2d at 486.  This may come into play when determining physical 
and mental pain and suffering. Id.  The court recommended the following jury instruction: 
If you find from the greater weight of the evidence that, as a proximate cause
of the injuries sustained, the plaintiff has suffered a permanent disability which
is evidenced by way of the inability to perform the usual activities of life such
as the basic mechanical body movements of walking, climbing stairs, feeding 
oneself, driving a car, etc., or by way of the inability to perform the plaintiff’s
usual specific activities which had given pleasure to this particular plaintiff,
you may consider, and make a separate award for, such damages.
Any amounts that you have determined will be awarded to the plaintiff for any
element of damages shall not be considered again or added to any other element of
damages. You shall be cautious in your consideration of the damages not to 
overlap or duplicate the amounts of your award which would result in double 
damages.
Id. at 486–87. 
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separate from pain and suffering.137  In Flannery v. United States (Flannery
I), the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia considered the relation
between lost joy and the permanency of a plaintiff’s injury in its 
determination of whether hedonic damages should be included within 
the category of pain and suffering.138  A jury looks at the permanency of
the injury to determine how the injury has affected the plaintiff’s “ability 
to perform and enjoy the ordinary functions of life.”139  The Flannery I
court recognized that a plaintiff can experience a loss of joy without 
feeling any pain and suffering; thus, it considered loss of joy an element 
of damages for permanency of injury.140 
Hedonic damages are occasionally classified as a type of “disability”
damages.141  Courts award disability damages “for the loss resulting from
complete or partial disability in health, mind, or person.”142  In Eyoma v.
Falco, a New Jersey superior court held that loss of pleasure and enjoyment 
damages is a “natural and direct consequence” of a plaintiff’s disability
or impairment.143  In New Jersey, disability and impairment damages
“encompass[] compensation for the inability to pursue one’s normal
activities and compensate[] for the status of being limited or
incapacitated.”144  The New Jersey court refused to group loss of enjoyment 
137. See id.  Disability damages “focus[] on the lessening of the plaintiff’s abilities 
from 100 percent rather than on the plaintiff’s particular activities and hobbies . . . .” 
Zitter, supra note 63, at 64. 
138. See 297 S.E.2d at 437. 
139. Id.  The Flannery I court decided that a portion of its definition of permanent
injury damages—“those future effects of an injury which have reduced the capability of 
an individual to function as a whole man”—encompassed the loss of joy a person experiences
from an injury.  Id. (quoting Jordan v. Bero, 210 S.E.2d 618, 634 (W. Va. 1974)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
140. Id.  Hedonic damages are not part of pain and suffering “in the traditional 
sense” because someone can endure an injury without suffering any physical pain. Id.
However, an injury can obviously “impair the person’s capacity to enjoy life.”  Id.
 141. See Holston v. Sisters of the Third Order of St. Francis, 618 N.E.2d 334, 347
(Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (holding that a disability “logically includes” the loss of joy one 
experiences from the disability-causing injury); Brown v. Glaxo, Inc., 790 So. 2d 35, 43 
(La. Ct. App. 2000) (“Although both are categories of general damages, loss of enjoyment is
a separate award from mental and physical pain and suffering.”); Eyoma v. Falco, 589
A.2d 653, 662 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991) (holding that loss of pleasure and
enjoyment damages are a result of a plaintiff’s disability and therefore should be taken
into account when calculating disability and impairment damages).
142. 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 228 (2003).  “The measure of [disability] damages . . .
is compensation for the disabling effect of the injury . . . .” Id.
 143.  Eyoma, 589 A.2d at 662. 












   



















of life damages with those damages recovered for pain and suffering, 
believing that the “inability to carry on activities and pursuits” should be
recognized and properly compensated.145  The  Eyoma court noted that
New Jersey has long accepted disability and impairment damages, which
“must provide just and adequate compensation for the interruption of 
mental and physical functions.”146  Because it believed that the separation of
loss of enjoyment of life damages from pain and suffering was not “too 
esoteric for a jury to understand,” the Eyoma court concluded that a jury
would not be “overly speculative or improperly punitive” when calculating 
hedonic damages along with pain and suffering damages.147  This  
conclusion allowed the jury to consider loss of enjoyment of life in the
calculation of disability and impairment damages.148 
C. The Inconsistent Treatment of Unconscious Plaintiffs 
Few states have considered whether unconscious plaintiffs can recover 
hedonic damages.149  The following analysis focuses on the limited number 
of states that have considered this issue. 
1. Persistent Vegetative State 
Because the court determined loss of enjoyment of life damages to
have “no meaning or utility” to a plaintiff in a persistent vegetative state,
the court in McDougald v. Garber decided that consciousness was
a prerequisite to an award of hedonic damages.150  In McDougald, the 
plaintiff Emma McDougald underwent a Caesarean section and the
accompanying surgeries.151  During surgery, she experienced oxygen
deprivation, which caused “severe brain damage and left her in a permanent
comatose condition.”152  The plaintiff’s husband, suing derivatively, brought 
an action seeking, among other things, damages for loss of enjoyment of 
life.153  In determining which damages were available to the plaintiff, the
court focused on the purpose of personal injury tort damages— 
145. Id. at 662. The Eyoma court’s discussion of disability and pain and suffering
damages was largely focused on the recovery of hedonic damages by plaintiffs in a persistent 
vegetative state. Id. at 661–62. 
146. Id. at 662. 
147. Id.
 148. Id. 
149. See infra Part III.C.1.
 150. See McDougald v. Garber, 536 N.E.2d 372, 375 (N.Y. 1989). 
151.  Id. at 373. 
152. Id.
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compensation, rather than punishment.154  Because nonpecuniary damages 
can be compensatory, the McDougald court noted that they rest on “the 
legal fiction that money damages can compensate for a victim’s injury.”155 
The McDougald court refused to “indulge this fiction” when a plaintiff 
lacks cognitive awareness of the loss.156  Because an unconscious plaintiff 
cannot use the money awarded “upon necessities or pleasures” or give it
away, the award does not provide the victim “with any consolation or 
ease any burden resting on him.”157  Despite acknowledging the paradoxical
situation that “the greater degree of brain injury inflicted by a negligent 
defendant, the smaller the award the plaintiff can recover in general 
damages,” the court determined that “meaningful compensation” rules
require that some cognitive awareness be present to recover hedonic
damages.158  Accordingly, the McDougald court held that the recovery of
loss of enjoyment of life damages requires cognitive awareness.159 
In contrast to the treatment of hedonic damages by New York courts, 
New Jersey courts allow for the recovery of loss of enjoyment of life
damages by plaintiffs in a persistent vegetative state.160  For example, in 
154. See id. at 375.  The goal of tort damages is to “restore the injured party, to the
extent possible, to the position that would have been occupied had the wrong not occurred.” 
Id. at 374.  “To be sure, placing the burden of compensation on the negligent party also serves
as a deterrent, but purely punitive damages—that is, those which have no compensatory
purpose—are prohibited unless the harmful conduct is intentional, malicious, outrageous, 
or otherwise aggravated beyond mere negligence.”  Id.
 155. Id. at 374–75 (quoting Howard v. Lecher, 366 N.E.2d 64, 65 (N.Y. 1977))
(internal quotation marks omitted).  Courts accept this “legal fiction” because it is the best
comfort that the law can provide the victim.  Id. at 375. 
156. See id.  The  McDougald court considered the recovery of compensatory
damages by plaintiffs in a persistent vegetative state to be punitive in nature because the 
damages ceased “to serve the compensatory goals of tort recovery.” Id.
 157. Id. (quoting Flannery v. United States (Flannery II), 718 F.2d 108, 111 (4th 
Cir. 1983)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
158. Id.  (quoting McDougald v. Garber, 504 N.Y.S.2d 383, 386 (App. Div. 1986)).  
“[T]he temptation is rooted in a desire to punish the defendant in proportion to the harm 
inflicted.  However relevant such retributive symmetry may be in the criminal law, it has 
no place in the law of civil damages, at least in the absence of culpability beyond mere 
negligence.” Id.
 159. Id.  The court went on to state that the fact finder need not “sort out varying
degrees of cognition” to determine when a plaintiff’s injury can be fully appreciated. Id. 
The court was satisfied with the use of the instruction that “some level of awareness” was
required.  Id.  This instruction ignored the varying levels of cognition, but the McDougald
court favored simplicity over “analytical purity.”  Id. “A more complex instruction might
give the appearance of greater precision but, given the limits of our understanding of the 
human mind, it would in reality lead only to greater speculation.” Id.












   







      





       
      
  
 
    
  
     
  
    
 
   
  
Eyoma v. Falco, the plaintiff suffered a deprivation of sufficient oxygen 
during a gallbladder removal surgery.161  Because of his oxygen deprivation,
the plaintiff remained in a persistent vegetative state until he died a year 
later.162 The Eyoma court acknowledged that consciousness is a prerequisite 
for an award of pain and suffering damages.163  However, the court
concluded that consciousness is not required for other compensatory 
damages, including disability and impairment.164 Because these two 
damage categories “encompass[] compensation for the inability to pursue 
one’s normal activities and compensate[] for the status of being limited
or incapacitated,” the Eyoma court determined that disability and 
impairment do not require the plaintiff to show conscious awareness of
the disability.165  From this, the court held that the loss of joy an injured 
plaintiff suffers is the usual result of the incapacity from a disability, and 
therefore, loss of enjoyment of life damages are not dependent upon a
161. Id. at 654–55. 
162. Id. at 655. 
163. Id. at 661.  The Eyoma court based its reasoning on a previous New Jersey
case, Lewis v. Read. See id. Lewis emphasized that pain and suffering damages must be 
“limited to compensation and compensation alone,” and “conscious suffering is the only
proper basis for pain and suffering.”  193 A.2d 255, 269 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1963). 
164. See Eyoma, 589 A.2d at 661. 
165. See id. at 661–62.  An Illinois appellate court, in Holston v. Sisters of the 
Third Order of St. Francis, also determined that plaintiffs who are unconscious of their 
loss can recover loss of enjoyment of life damages by including them within damages for 
disability.  618 N.E.2d 334, 347 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993).  In Holston, the plaintiff underwent 
gastric bypass surgery in order to relieve her morbid obesity. Id. at 337.  While in surgery, the
plaintiff’s heart was pierced, causing her to suffer cardiac arrest. Id. at 338.  The plaintiff
ultimately suffered permanent brain damage.  See id. at 340.  The plaintiff’s husband and
children brought a negligence action and requested loss of enjoyment of life damages.
Id. at 337. The appellate court allowed for the recovery of loss of enjoyment of life
damages by the plaintiff, even though she was in a persistent vegetative state.  Id. at 347. 
The court stated that because plaintiffs in persistent vegetative states have been “disabled” to
the extent that they have been “deprived of [their] consciousness and therefore [their] ability
to enjoy . . . life,” they are entitled to loss of enjoyment of life damages despite their
unconsciousness. Id.  The Holston court was also presented with the issue of whether 
plaintiffs must be aware of their own disfigurement to be awarded disfigurement damages.
Id. at 347–48. The court declined to consider this “awareness requirement” because it 
believed that the jury could have properly awarded the $400,000 to the plaintiff based on 
her disability alone. Id. at 348. However, this presents another example of the possible
injustice a plaintiff in a persistent vegetative state can experience. See Fla. Patient’s Comp. 
Fund v. Von Stetina, 474 So. 2d 783, 792 (Fla. 1985) (Boyd, C.J., dissenting) (stating that a
comatose plaintiff should be able to recover compensatory damages, including those for
disfigurement and loss of enjoyment of life, in order to prevent “the most grievously
injured individuals” from receiving a reduced award “because of the nature and seriousness” 
of their injuries).  Some disfigurements can be even more easily identified than loss of 
joy, yet plaintiffs that suffer from lack of consciousness will be denied the recovery for 
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showing of conscious loss.166  Accordingly, the Eyoma court compensated 
the comatose plaintiff, who lost “the real personal joy and pleasure” that
he “might have otherwise experienced,” with loss of enjoyment of life 
damages.167 
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia similarly held that 
plaintiffs in a persistent vegetative state could recover hedonic damages.168 
In Flannery v. United States, the plaintiff was only twenty-two years old 
when he was involved in an automobile accident that placed him in a
permanently semicomatose state.169  The court determined the permanency
of the plaintiff’s injury by looking at whether his capability to “function
as a whole man” had been reduced.170  By using this concept and ignoring
the label “loss of enjoyment of life,” the Flannery I court stripped the 
subjective content of the damage award.171  This allowed the court to hold 
that “the plaintiff’s lack of knowledge of the extent of his permanent 
injury is not a factor under the Jordan ‘whole man’ test.”172  The Flannery I
court also compared the situation of a comatose plaintiff to other situations 
in which the ability to comprehend a permanent injury is minimal.173 
For instance, permanently injured infants or children can recover permanent 
injury damages despite their inability to understand the extent of their 
166. See Eyoma, 589 A.2d at 662.  “Thus, a plaintiff who has been comatose should, as
part of disability and impairment, be compensated for the loss caused by existing in a 
comatose state including the resultant loss of enjoyment of normal activities.” Id.
 167. Id. The Eyoma court was concerned that the other forms of damages would
not sufficiently compensate a comatose plaintiff.  Id.  Damages for out-of-pocket pecuniary
loss, medical care, and loss of consortium “cannot fully or adequately compensate for the 
total disability inflicted on the injured tort victim who is rendered comatose.” Id.
A similar conclusion was reached by a Louisiana appellate court in Brown v. Glaxo, Inc.
See 790 So. 2d 35, 43 (La. Ct. App. 2000).  In Brown, a woman was in a vegetative state
and therefore not “conscious” of her loss, precluding her recovery of pain and suffering. Id.
The court did allow for the recovery of hedonic damages, stating “the argument that a 
wife and mother in her early forties did not lose the enjoyment of her life for the almost
two years she remained in a vegetative state cannot be seriously supported.” Id.
168.  Flannery v. United States (Flannery I), 297 S.E.2d 433, 438 (W. Va. 1982). 
169. See 649 F.2d 270, 271 (4th Cir. 1981); Flannery I, 297 S.E.2d at 434. 
170. See Flannery I, 297 S.E.2d at 436.  In Jordan v. Bero, the Supreme Court of
Appeals of West Virginia stated, “Residuals or those future effects of an injury which have 
reduced the capability of an individual to function as a whole man” is the manner in which
courts should define the recovery of damages for the permanent effects of an injury.  210
S.E.2d 618, 634 (W. Va. 1974). 
171. See Flannery I, 297 S.E.2d at 438. 
172. Id.













   



















injuries.174  The Flannery I court disagreed with the argument that a
plaintiff must be conscious of the plaintiff’s permanent injury to recover 
hedonic damages, which it analogized to a situation in which a defendant 
is not liable for “injuries made more severe because of the plaintiff’s
preexisting ill health or disability.”175  Because of the injustice that would 
unfold from precluding the recovery of loss of enjoyment of life damages to
a plaintiff in a persistent vegetative state, the court held that consciousness 
of loss of joy is not a condition for recovery of hedonic damages.176 
Another method by which to determine the compensatory damages 
available to a plaintiff in a persistent vegetative state is illustrated in 
Gregory v. Carey.177  In  Gregory, the plaintiff, Mark Marquette, suffered 
severe brain damage during preparation for knee surgery.178  Marquette 
entered a persistent vegetative state, a state of “wakeful unresponsiveness,”
from which he would never completely recover.179  Marquette’s guardian
and conservator brought an action against the defendants, including an 
anesthesia service, a doctor, and a medical center, asking the court to award 
several items of damages, including those for loss of enjoyment of life.180 
Kansas courts allow the recovery of pain and suffering damages only
by plaintiffs who consciously experience the pain or suffering.181  However, 
the Gregory court allowed the plaintiff to introduce evidence that attempted 
to demonstrate that a plaintiff in a persistent vegetative state can in fact 
experience pain or suffering.182  Even though the court included loss
174. See id. at 438–39.  A common example of this situation is one in which an 
infant is blinded by the use of too much oxygen in an incubator. Id. at 438.  A child in that 
situation “would be unaware of what full vision meant and consequently his permanency
as reflected by his subjective knowledge of his loss of enjoyment of visual life would be 
minimal.” Id. at 439. 
175. Id.
 176. See id. (“We accordingly hold that a plaintiff in a personal injury action who 
has been rendered permanently semi-comatose is entitled to recover for the impairment 
of his capacity to enjoy life as a measure of the permanency of his injuries even though
he may not be able to sense his loss of enjoyment of life.”). 
177.  791 P.2d 1329 (Kan. 1990). 
178.  Id. at 1331. 
179. Id.
 180. Id.
 181. See id. at 1333.  In Leiker ex rel. Leiker v. Gafford, the Kansas Supreme Court
held that “damages are recoverable only for pain and suffering which is consciously
experienced.” 778 P.2d 823, 836 (Kan. 1989). The Leiker court also concluded that
hedonic damages are included within the larger category of pain and suffering damages.
Id. at 835; see also Loss of Enjoyment of Life as a Distinct Element, supra note 43, at 
299 & n.12 (noting the same thing in another case, Hogan v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 
85 P.2d 28 (Kan. 1938)). 
182. See Gregory, 791 P.2d at 1334.  An earlier Kansas court also allowed for the 
introduction of evidence that a patient in a semicomatose state experienced loss of
enjoyment of life.  See Leiker, 778 P.2d at 835.  The court stated that “loss of enjoyment 
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of enjoyment of life damages with pain and suffering and disability 
damages,183 a plaintiff in a persistent vegetative state would still be able
to potentially recover loss of enjoyment of life damages.184  The Gregory
court’s decision is notable because of its inclusion of loss of enjoyment
of life in more general categories of damages, despite its acknowledgement 
of the difference between all of the types of damages resulting from 
physical injuries.185  The opinion openly recognized that disability damages 
compensate a plaintiff for permanent injuries, notwithstanding any pain or
inconvenience; pain and suffering damages, by contrast, allow plaintiffs 
to recover damages for the physical and mental discomfort associated
with their injuries.186  Loss of enjoyment of life is also its own type of 
disability and pain and suffering, and may certainly be argued by counsel to the jury.” 
Id.  An Ohio appellate court also allowed for the introduction of evidence that a patient
in a persistent vegetative state experienced pain or suffering.  See Watkins v. Cleveland 
Clinic Found., 719 N.E.2d 1052, 1066–67 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998).  Because there was 
conflicting evidence from doctors on whether the patient experienced pain, the matter 
was a question of fact to be resolved by the jury. Id. at 1066. 
183. See Gregory, 791 P.2d at 1336. 
184. See id.  “[T]he trial court properly allowed plaintiff to argue in closing that 
[the patient in the persistent vegetative state] had suffered a loss of enjoyment of life and
instructed the jury that such a loss is an element of disability, pain, and suffering.” Id. 
The Gregory court’s attempt at allowing plaintiffs in a persistent vegetative state to recover
hedonic damages through a showing of the presence of pain runs in direct conflict with
most medical findings on the topic. See, e.g., The Multi-Society Task Force on PVS, Medical 
Aspects of the Persistent Vegetative State (pt. 2), 330 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1572, 1576 (1994).
“[E]xtensive clinical experience, the results of positron-emission tomographic (PET)
studies, and neuropathologic examination support the belief that patients in a persistent 
vegetative state are unaware and insensate and therefore lack the cerebral cortical capacity to
be conscious of pain.” Id.  The Gregory opinion cites testimony from a neurologist, Dr. 
Dilawer Abbas, stating that “when he struck Marquette with a pin, ‘there was some reaction
when he moaned and sighed.’”  791 P.2d at 1334.  The doctor testified that he believed 
Marquette’s response “was not purely a reflex.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
However, science accepts that the small responses to stimulation by plaintiffs in a persistent
vegetative state are simply “behavioral responses governed by functional motor systems,” and
“[n]one of these responses necessarily reflect the perception of pain.”  The Multi-Society
Task Force on PVS, supra, at 1576 (“The perceptions of pain and suffering are conscious
experiences: unconsciousness, by definition, precludes these experiences.”).
185. See Gregory, 791 P.2d at 1336. 
186. See id. (quoting Thompson v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 621 F.2d 814, 824
(6th Cir. 1980)).  In Thompson, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit applied
Tennessee law in determining whether a damage award for physical injuries sustained by
passengers on a train was duplicative.  621 F.2d at 824–25.  Tennessee allows for the 
recovery of damages for pain, suffering, and fright.  Id.  However, damages for fright 
alone cannot be recovered.  See Hoskins v. Blalock, 384 F.2d 169, 171 (6th Cir. 1967).













   
      
     
 
       
 
 
   
   




    
   
 






   
  
  
damages, compensating the victim for the restrictions placed on the victim’s
life by the injury.187  In spite of these seemingly obvious differences, the
court decided to include loss of enjoyment of life as a subcategory of the
other two damage categories and in fact failed to clarify how to take into 
account loss of enjoyment of life when determining pain and suffering or 
disability awards.188 
2. Federal Tort Claims Act 
Under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), the United States is liable 
in the same manner as “private individual[s] under like circumstances” 
but cannot be liable for “interest prior to judgment or for punitive 
damages.”189  Federal courts have jurisdiction over these claims but must 
apply the law of the state “where the act or omission occurred.”190 The 
exception to the rule applies in situations where the law of the state
provides only for punitive damages in regard to the injury in question.191 
187. See Gregory, 791 P.2d at 1336 (quoting Thompson, 621 F.2d at 824). 
188. See id.  The court decided to include loss of enjoyment of life “within the 
more traditional areas of damages for disability and pain and suffering.” Id.
189. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (2006).  Under the FTCA, plaintiffs can recover money damages
for damage to property or personal injury caused by government employees. See 1 JACOB A. 
STEIN ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 6A.04 (Matthew Bender ed. 2012).  In order to 
recover, plaintiffs must prove “that the negligence or wrongful conduct of a government 
employee caused the injury.” Id.  The government is liable in the same manner as “private
individual[s] under like circumstances” in that the FTCA imposes liability on the United 
States under circumstances where, if it were a private person, it would be liable to the
claimant. Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (stating the same). 
190. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1).  Courts often refuse to allow claims under the FTCA
based on “direct violation[] of the federal Constitution, statutes, or regulations” because
of the provision that the law “where the . . . act or omission occurred” applies.  1 STEIN 
ET AL., supra note 189, § 6A.04[2][g] (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1)).  Section 2680 also 
lists claims that are excluded under the FTCA, including “[a]ny claim based upon an act 
or omission of an employee of the Government, exercising due care, in the execution of
a statute or regulation, whether or not such statute or regulation be valid.”  28 U.S.C.
§ 2680(a).  This exclusion is commonly referred to as the “discretionary function exclusion.” 
1 STEIN ET AL., supra note 189, § 6A.04[3][a]. The discretionary function exclusion is 
said to be an example of Congress “exercis[ing] care to protect the Government from 
claims, however negligently caused, that affected the governmental functions.”  Dalehite 
v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 32 (1953).
191. See 28 U.S.C. § 2674.  As stated in Flannery v. United States (Flannery II), the 
United States’ liability encompasses all compensatory damages.  718 F.2d 108, 110 (4th 
Cir. 1983).  However, “the question arises about the allowability of damages treated and
labeled under state law as ‘compensatory’ which are in excess of those necessary to provide 
compensation for injuries and losses actually sustained.”  Id.  The Flannery II court went
on to clarify that the question of what is and is not punitive is a federal question.  Id.
Whether an award is punitive should not be decided by the “widely varying laws of the
fifty states, but under a uniform standard.”  Id.  “[A] state’s statutory measure of damages
‘must be judged not by its language or the state’s characterization, but by its consequences.’” 
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In that case, the United States is liable for actual or compensatory
damages.192  Some federal courts have held that under the FTCA, an
unconscious plaintiff, who is incapable of enjoying anything, cannot recover 
loss of capacity to enjoy life damages, whether or not the damages would
be recoverable under the applicable state law.193
 In Flannery v. United States (Flannery II), the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit certified a question to the West Virginia Supreme Court 
regarding the recovery of loss of capacity to enjoy life damages by
comatose plaintiffs.194  The West Virginia Supreme Court held that hedonic
damages are recoverable by a comatose plaintiff, despite the fact that the
plaintiff “has no awareness of . . . loss.”195  The Flannery II court would 
have accepted the Flannery I court’s response had it not determined that 
the issue involved a federal question and therefore had to be decided 
based on federal law.196  The Fourth Circuit acknowledged that a plaintiff in
a persistent vegetative state has lost the capacity to enjoy life.197  Further, 
the court held that an award made to a comatose patient for loss of
enjoyment of life does not ease any pain or give any consolation to the 
patient.198  An award in this situation would be used only by the plaintiff’s
relatives and therefore would be compensatory only to those who survive 
192. See 28 U.S.C. § 2674. 
193. See, e.g., Flannery II, 718 F.2d at 111.  In Nemmers v. United States, the 
United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois also analyzed the awarding
of hedonic damages to a plaintiff under the FTCA.  681 F. Supp. 567, 569, 576 (C.D. Ill. 
1988).  However, in that case, the plaintiff was mentally disabled and considered “conscious.” 
Id. at 575–76. The court determined that under Flannery II, the plaintiff could recover
damages for loss of enjoyment of life because he was still “mentally conscious” and “aware.”
Id.  However, the court wrote that the $1 million award requested by plaintiff was excessive
given its intent: compensation. Id. at 576.  Recognizing the plaintiff’s “abilities and 
disabilities,” the court awarded the plaintiff $400,000. Id.
194. 297 S.E.2d 433, 434 (W. Va. 1982).  The Supreme Court of Appeals of West 
Virginia’s answer to the certified question was previously discussed. See supra notes 136–40,
168–76 and accompanying text. 
195. Flannery II, 718 F.2d at 110; see also Flannery I, 297 S.E.2d at 439 (holding 
that a plaintiff in a permanently semicomatose state may recover enjoyment of life 
damages “even though he may not be able to sense his loss of enjoyment of life”). 
196. See Flannery II, 718 F.2d at 110. 
197. Id. at 111.  A plaintiff in a persistent vegetative state is “conscious of nothing 
and incapable of enjoying anything.”  Id.  Plaintiffs in Flannery’s state are also rather 
susceptible to infections, and “[t]here is no likelihood whatever that [they] will ever become
aware of anything.” Id.
 198. See id.
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the plaintiff and inherit the award.199 Therefore, the award would be
punitive in nature and not allowed under the FTCA.200  Accordingly, the
Fourth Circuit held that it was sufficient to award damages for future
medical care.201 
The Second Circuit, on the other hand, allows for an award of hedonic 
damages to a comatose plaintiff under the FTCA.202  In Rufino v. United 
States, a New York hospital admitted the plaintiff, Neil Rufino, after he
had suffered a heart attack.203  Doctors erroneously concluded that he had
recovered from the heart attack, and Rufino suffered a second attack.204 
After suffering from oxygen deprivation, Rufino entered a permanent 
comatose state.205  In deciding whether Rufino was entitled to hedonic
damages, the appellate court—as prescribed by the FTCA—looked to New 
York’s law on loss of enjoyment of life damages.206  Because New York 
had not yet resolved the issue, the Second Circuit attempted to determine 
the rule that New York would enforce.207  The Second Circuit believed
that, based on the current state of the law in New York, the New York
courts would adopt the rule laid out in McDougald v. Garber,208 an opinion 
that allowed for the recovery of loss of enjoyment of life by plaintiffs in a
persistent vegetative state.209  The Rufino court was persuaded by the lower
court’s reasoning and adopted its holding.210 
199. See id.  The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia awarded $1.3 million
for loss of enjoyment of life.  Id.  The Flannery II court decided that the award the plaintiff 
received for medical care would provide enough for his “maintenance as well as his
nursing and professional care.”  Id.  The $1.3 million could not provide the plaintiff with any
“direct benefit” and therefore was determined to be punitive. Id.
 200. See id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (2006) (“The United States . . . shall not be 
liable . . . for punitive damages.”).
201. See Flannery II, 718 F.2d at 111. 
202.  See Rufino v. United States, 829 F.2d 354, 362 (2d Cir. 1987). 
203.  See id. at 356. 
204. See id.
 205. Id.
 206. Id. at 359.
 207. See id.  If this issue had reached the Third Circuit after 1989, McDougald v. 
Garber would have applied and the court would have been forced to deny the awarding of
hedonic damages to a comatose patient.  See 536 N.E.2d 372, 375 (N.Y. 1989) (holding
that cognitive awareness must be present to recover loss of enjoyment of life damages). 
208.  504 N.Y.S.2d 383 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986). The McDougald court stated,
Proof of the loss of enjoyment of life relates not to what is perceived by the injured 
plaintiff but to the objective total or partial limitations on an individual’s activities
imposed by an injury.  A jury, if properly charged, will not make redundant awards 
in assessing damages for the loss of enjoyment of life and conscious pain and 
suffering.  The loss is to be assessed objectively, that is, by the difference between
the injured plaintiff’s current capacity and those which existed before the injury.
Id. at 386. 
209. See id. at 387 (holding that “failure to treat loss of enjoyment of life separately
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The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit also affirmed an award for 
loss of enjoyment of life under the FTCA.211  In  Frankel v. Heym, the
plaintiff, Marilyn Heym, was almost totally disabled after her car was
involved in an accident with an army vehicle.212 The district court awarded 
the plaintiff $650,000 in damages, which was said to encompass damages
for pain and suffering, loss of enjoyment of life, and “inconvenience,
disfigurement and permanent injuries.”213 Recognizing that translating
human loss into monetary value is inherently difficult, the Third Circuit 
determined that the plaintiff’s damage award was not “shocking, unfair 
or biased.”214  The Third Circuit was able to come to this conclusion 
because of the district court’s analysis of the relevant considerations in 
the case, including the pain the plaintiff endured and her inability to
communicate with those she recognized while in a coma.215 
3. Similar Situations 
a. Alzheimer’s Disease 
Alzheimer’s disease is a “progressive and irreversible” brain disorder216 
that poses a significant obstacle when determining hedonic damage
awards.217  Specifically, Alzheimer’s is a preexisting condition that can 
affect the “value of the interest destroyed.”218 Because of the effects 
Alzheimer’s has on a plaintiff’s brain, courts have taken various approaches 
in incorporating the disease into the determination of hedonic damages.219 
One such approach suggests that no recovery of loss of enjoyment of
life damages should be allowed for plaintiffs that suffer from Alzheimer’s
tort damages, to make an injured plaintiff whole, as far as possible, by compensating for 
each loss suffered”).
210. See 829 F.2d at 361. 
211. See Frankel v. Heym, 466 F.2d 1226, 1228 (3d Cir. 1972). 
212.  Id. at 1227. 
213. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
214.  Id. at 1228. 
215. See id. at 1227–28. 
216. Nicholson, supra note 20, at 250. 
217.  See id. at 253. 
218. Id. at 265. A preexisting condition is a “disease, condition, or force that has
become sufficiently associated with the victim to be factored into the value of the interest
destroyed.”  Id. (quoting Joseph H. King, Jr., Causation, Valuation, and Chance in Personal 
Injury Torts Involving Preexisting Conditions and Future Consequences, 90 YALE L.J.
1353, 1357 (1981)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
































   
   










disease.220  This rule suggests that Alzheimer’s is a disease that renders a
plaintiff completely incapacitated and therefore unable to experience 
pleasure or enjoyment of life prior to the wrongdoer’s actions.221  Critics
of this “no-recovery” rule argue that different stages of Alzheimer’s can 
have differing effects on plaintiffs and that current data does not support
the contention that those with Alzheimer’s have no enjoyment of life.222 
A second approach calls for the full recovery of hedonic damages by a
plaintiff with Alzheimer’s disease.223  The strongest argument in favor of 
this approach is deterrence.224  Because of the potential for malpractice
claims against physicians, tort liability can successfully deter possible 
wrongful actions on their part.225  Alzheimer’s patients benefit from this
deterrence because they are often in nursing homes or under the care of a 
physician.226  Conversely, the argument against such an approach is 
overdeterrence.227  Physicians that are worried about possible malpractice
suits may “administer[] more tests, shoot[] more X rays, and pile[] on a 
paper trail.”228 
A third approach for the recovery of hedonic damages by those with
Alzheimer’s disease is the independent jury determination of hedonic 
damages, which would allow for the jury to decide, without the guidance 
of experts, the percentage of loss of enjoyment of life suffered by the 
Alzheimer’s plaintiff.229  This approach may pose problems because of the
uncertainties coming from jury determinations that are not based on expert 
guidance.230  Nevertheless, several scholars endorse such an approach.231 
220. Id. at 268. 
221. Id.  Another argument in support of this rule finds its support in psychological
and medical literature.  Id. at 269.  “According to some commentators, disabilities, such 
as Alzheimer’s disease, frequently impact on life satisfaction or enjoyment.”  Id.
222. See id. at 271–72. 
223. See id. at 272. 
224. See id.  Some commentators also believe that there is a second argument in
favor of full recovery of loss of enjoyment of life damages by Alzheimer’s patients— 
“monetary damages for elderly individuals in personal injury and wrongful death claims 
are usually low.”  Id. at 273. In addition, Alzheimer’s disease progresses differently in
each individual, and some only experience small change over a rather long period of time.
See id. at 274.  An Alzheimer’s patient might even live up to twenty years after being
diagnosed. Id.  This may indicate that a person with Alzheimer’s can enjoy life “throughout 
the course of the illness.” Id.
 225. See id. at 273–74. 
226. See id. at 273. 
227. See id. at 275. 
228. Id. at n.214 (quoting PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY 170 (1988)).
229. Id. at 283. 
230. See id. at 286. 
231. See e.g., id. at 287.  In her note, Lori Nicholson concludes that jurors should 
determine the amount of hedonic damages without the help of expert guidance on the 
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b. Wrongful Life and Birth 
Wrongful life and birth actions are relatively new tort causes of 
action.232  A wrongful life action alleges that the parents of a child born
with birth defects would not have conceived or given birth to the child 
but for the negligent actions of the doctor.233  Either the parents of the
child or the child may bring a wrongful life action.234 By contrast, only 
the parents of a child born with birth defects may bring a wrongful birth 
action.235  Wrongful birth actions commonly arise from the failure of
232. See Gregory G. Sarno, Annotation, Tort Liability for Wrongfully Causing One
To Be Born, 83 A.L.R. 3D 15, 19 (1978).  A wrongful life action is a cause of action 
brought by the infant “on allegations that its very existence is wrongful and that ‘but for’ 
the defendant’s misfeasance it would not exist.” Id. at n.3.  Wrongful birth actions, on
the other hand, are brought by a member of the infant’s family “on allegations attributing
the infant’s unplanned or unwanted birth to the tortfeasor’s misfeasance.” Id. at n.4. 
233. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1752 (9th ed. 2009).  In order to successfully
bring a wrongful life action, either the child or the child’s parents must prove “that the 
physician had a duty to inform the child’s parents of the potential deformity, that the 
physician failed to inform the parents adequately, and that the parents would have 
prevented the birth of the child if the parents had been so informed.”  1 DAVID R. ILER ET 
AL., HEALTH LAW PRACTICE GUIDE § 12:15 (2012).  Some states do not allow wrongful 
life actions for births prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade. See 410 U.S. 
113, 153 (1973) (holding that a person’s constitutional right to privacy “is broad enough to 
encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy”); Hummel v.
Reiss, 589 A.2d 1041, 1042 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991), aff’d, 608 A.2d 1341 (N.J.
1992).  In Hummel v. Reiss, a New Jersey superior court determined that at the time of the 
plaintiff’s pregnancy, she could not obtain a “eugenic” abortion or an abortion “directed
solely to eliminate a potentially defective fetus.”  589 A.2d at 1042. Therefore, for any
births prior to Roe, the doctors owed a duty of care only to the mother.  Id.  In addition, 
the superior court noted that in Planned Parenthood of New York City, Inc. v. New Jersey 
Department of Institutions, 379 A.2d 841, 842 (N.J. 1977), the New Jersey Supreme 
Court rejected a claim that Roe v. Wade applied retroactively. See Hummel, 589 A.2d at 
1042. Some states refuse to recognize wrongful life actions all together.  See 1 ILER ET 
AL., supra, § 12:15; see also Walker ex rel. Pizano v. Mart, 790 P.2d 735, 740 (Ariz. 
1990) (en banc) (holding that the impairment of a child does not automatically imply a 
“legally cognizable injury” because “any wrong that was done was a wrong to the parents, not
to the fetus”); Greco v. United States, 893 P.2d 345, 347 (Nev. 1995) (holding that 
Nevada courts do not recognize wrongful life actions because the claims “would require
[courts] to weigh the harms suffered by virtue of the child’s having been born with severe 
handicaps against ‘the utter void of nonexistence’ . . . a calculation the courts are incapable
of performing” (quoting Gleitman ex rel. Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689, 692 (N.J. 
1967))).
234. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1752 (9th ed. 2009); 1 ILER ET AL., supra note 
233, § 12:15. 
235. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1752 (9th ed. 2009); 1 ILER ET AL., supra note 
233, § 12:16.  Wrongful birth actions differ from wrongful life actions in that the parents
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doctors to administer tests that detect genetic deformities or the
negligent performance of those tests.236  In measuring damages in a
wrongful birth or life case, the court must take into account the harm caused 
by having an “unwanted child” against the “joy[s] of parenthood.”237 The
recovery of hedonic damages in wrongful life and birth actions provides 
a useful comparison to the recovery by plaintiffs in a persistent vegetative 
state.238
 In Nemmer v. United States, a district court in Illinois allowed for the 
recovery of loss of enjoyment of life damages in a wrongful life action.239 
Because the child was born with a disability, the court found that he would 
never live a full and complete life and that he experienced “a drastic
reduction in ‘enjoyment of life.’”240  The court declined to speculate
whether the child would have gotten married, been a parent, or enjoyed a 
particular activity.241  Instead, it acknowledged that he would never be
bringing the action need not claim that their child would have been aborted if they had 
known about the genetic defect. See Provenzano v. Integrated Genetics, 22 F. Supp. 2d
406, 415 (D. N.J. 1998) (holding that a “but for” proximate cause test does not apply to 
wrongful birth claims and the parents need not show that but for the doctor’s negligence,
they would have aborted their child). Thirty-one states currently recognize wrongful 
birth actions, including California, Arizona, New York, and Texas. See Bader v.
Johnson, 675 N.E.2d 1119, 1122–23 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997), vacated 732 N.E.2d 1212 (Ind. 
2000).  However, several states do not recognize wrongful birth actions.  See, e.g., Azzolino
v. Dingfelder, 337 S.E.2d 528, 536 (N.C. 1985) (“[T]he myriad problems arising from
claims for . . . wrongful birth can be resolved properly only by a legislative body.”).  Some
states also recognize a wrongful conception or wrongful pregnancy cause of action, which
arises when a child without birth defects is born after the mother or father was sterilized. 
See 1 ILER ET AL., supra note 233, § 12:16; see also Walker ex rel. Pizano, 790 P.2d at 737 
(stating that in a wrongful conception or pregnancy case, “parents of a normal but unplanned
child seek damages either from a physician who allegedly was negligent in performing a
sterilization procedure or abortion, or from a pharmacist or pharmaceutical manufacturer
who allegedly was negligent in dispensing or manufacturing a contraceptive prescription or
device”).  The jurisdictions that allow for wrongful conception or pregnancy causes of
action usually allow recovery only for the expenses of the child’s birth, but some allow
for pain and suffering. See Miller v. Johnson, 343 S.E.2d 301, 305, 307 (Va. 1986); 1 ILER ET 
AL., supra note 233, § 12:16. 
236. See 1 ILER ET AL., supra note 233, § 12:16. 
237. Sarno, supra note 232, at 21. 
238. See 1 ILER ET AL., supra note 233, §§ 12:15–12:16.  Wrongful life and birth
actions are brought after the birth of a child with genetic defects. Id.  Some birth defects, 
such as Down syndrome, are lifelong and affect a person’s quality of life. See A.D.A.M.
Medical Encyclopedia, Down Syndrome: Trisomy 21, PUBMED HEALTH, http://www.ncbi.
nlm.nih.gov/pubmedhealth/PMH0001992/ (last reviewed May 10, 2013).  Therefore, it can be
argued that those with severe genetic disorders are suffering from a loss of joy similar to
that suffered by unconscious plaintiffs. 
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able to do most of the normal activities in life and therefore would be 
suffering a loss of joy.242 
By contrast, the majority of courts have declined to allow hedonic 
damage recovery in wrongful birth or life actions.243  In Ramos v. Kuzas, 
the Supreme Court of Ohio narrowly construed the definition of hedonic 
damages to include only the inability to perform the “usual specific 
activities” that the plaintiff enjoyed.244  Because the plaintiff was injured 
either in utero or at birth, she had not yet developed the ability to perform an
enjoyable activity and did not have any hobbies that she previously enjoyed
and was no longer able to perform.245  The court, however, did allow the
plaintiff to recover for her “basic losses,” which included the basic
242. See id.  Because “none of the accoutrements of normalcy” existed in the plaintiff’s
life, “the loss of enjoyment of life means a loss of any objective expectation of ever
being able to experience those aspects of life normally considered to be part of our day to
day existence.” Id.  The court also determined that the recovery of hedonic damages in
this case was allowed under the FTCA.  See id.  The court found that 
an award for loss of enjoyment of life is appropriate here pursuant to Maryland
law and the Federal Tort Claims Act.  The Court further finds that, in keeping
with the degree of loss of enjoyment of life involved, [plaintiff’s] limited ability to
comprehend, and the significant period of time that this loss of enjoyment of 
life is expected to continue (for the rest of [plaintiff’s] life), $400,000 is the 
appropriate sum to compensate him for this loss. 
Id. at 577. 
243. See Moscatello v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of N.J., 776 A.2d 874, 881–82
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (declining to apply the Eyoma v. Falco holding to 
wrongful life suits and holding that a loss of enjoyment of life claim cannot be made by a 
plaintiff in a wrongful life case). But see Cepeda v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosps. Corp., 756
N.Y.S.2d 189, 190 (App. Div. 2003).  In Cepeda v. New York City Health & Hospitals Corp., 
the plaintiff lived for only twelve days, during which time she required constant medical 
care and invasive procedures.  756 N.Y.S.2d at 190.  The delivering doctor’s negligence
caused the infant’s medical issues.  Id.  When the trial court reduced the damage award from
$12 million to $750,000, the appellate court ruled the reduction to be excessive. Id. The 
appellate court rejected the trial court’s reasoning that an infant “could not have any
cognitive awareness of her impending death” and applied the standard from McDougald v.
Garber, 536 N.E.2d 372 (N.Y. 1989), prohibiting the fact finder from “sort[ing] out [the]
varying degrees of cognition and determin[ing] at what level a particular deprivation can be
fully appreciated.” Id. (quoting McDougald, 536 N.E.2d at 375 (internal quotation marks 
omitted)).
244. Ramos v. Kuzas, 600 N.E.2d 241, 243 (Ohio 1992) (citing Fantozzi v. Sandusky
Cement Prods. Co., 597 N.E.2d 474, 486 (Ohio 1992)).  The court’s examples of the usual, 
specific enjoyable activities included “playing golf, dancing, bowling, playing musical
instruments, and engaging in specific outdoor sports.” Id.





   
  
  
   
 
    
    
 
 
    
  
  



















       
 
     
mechanical body movements.246  Additionally, the court made clear that if a
plaintiff recovers for the loss of ability to perform usual activities, which
also includes the permanency of a disabling injury, the jury cannot award
damages for that same loss when considering other damages, including 
“physical and mental pain and suffering.”247  Because there is a high
likelihood that a plaintiff in a persistent vegetative state is old enough to
have enjoyed specific activities that bring pleasure, the Ramos court’s 
ruling might allow for the recovery of loss of enjoyment of life damages 
by those plaintiffs, as long as that loss is not also taken into account when
computing other types of damages.248 
c. Wrongful Death 
Wrongful death actions provide recovery to certain relatives of plaintiffs
killed by the negligence of others.249  In order to determine which damages
to award, courts look to the loss suffered by the relatives or the deceased’s
estate, rather than the loss suffered by the deceased.250  Because of 
246. Id.  The court’s examples of basic mechanical body movements included 
“walking, climbing stairs, feeding oneself, and driving a car.” Id. (citing Fantozzi, 597 N.E.2d
at 484–85). 
247. Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Fantozzi, 597 N.E.2d at 486). 
248. See id.
 249. See 1 NATES ET AL., supra note 35, § 8.04.
250. See id.
Damages recovered on behalf of the decedent’s estate are generally distributed
to the heirs in the same manner as intestate personal property is distributed, or, 
in some states, according to the provisions of the decedent’s will pertaining to 
distribution of personal property.  Damages recovered on behalf of the survivors, to
compensate them for their pecuniary losses are, in some states, apportioned by
the court or the jury and distributed to the beneficiaries according to the pecuniary 
loss sustained.  In other states, however, the award is distributed to the beneficiaries 
in the same manner as intestate personal property would be distributed. 
10 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 30, § 45.08.  Wrongful death actions are one of the
civil counterparts to criminal actions brought by “the people” on behalf of the deceased
plaintiff. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., How Far May a Lawyer Go in Assisting a Client
in Legally Wrongful Conduct?, 35 U. MIAMI L. REV. 669, 674 (1980).  Criminal actions 
seek to punish wrongdoers for their breach and violation of public rights and duties.  See,
e.g., United States v. Colasuonno, 697 F.3d 164, 177 (2d Cir. 2012) (“[A] criminal action 
seeks, in the end, to punish a person for crimes committed against the public . . . .”).
Under the utilitarian theory, punishment in criminal cases is used to maximize the net
happiness of society. See Guyora Binder & Nicholas J. Smith, Framed: Utilitarianism 
and Punishment of the Innocent, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 115, 116 (2000).  Punishment is 
permitted under the utilitarian theory only if “its benefits in reducing future crime outweigh 
the pain, fear, and public expense it imposes.” Id.  Under the retributive theory, on the other 
hand, punishment is limited to the amount deserved. See Dan Markel, Retributive Damages:
A Theory of Punitive Damages as Intermediate Sanction, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 239, 242 
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the focus on the loss of the survivors, loss of enjoyment of life claims 
are not common in wrongful death actions.251  However, some courts have
awarded hedonic damages in wrongful death suits.252
 In Sherrod v. Berry, a district court in Illinois allowed for the recovery
of hedonic damages in a wrongful death action filed under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1983.253  An expert witness testified to the “hedonic value of life,” which 
included the “pleasure of living which is destroyed by the blow that is 
lethal.”254  The court believed the expert witness’s evidence was 
“competent” and established a “legitimate” item of damage, therefore
making it relevant and admissible.255  This evidence allowed for the 
recovery of hedonic damages, despite being difficult to measure.256 
The Sherrod court also acknowledged that the recovery of the hedonic 
value of life has been recoverable in Anglo-American law.257  Although
the recovery of hedonic damages is “novel,” it is not completely
“unknown” and is therefore supported by the past actions of both
English and American courts.258 
the defendant’s interests on account of an offense against the legal order”).  Retributive 
damages “create a message that the offender’s behavior is prohibited.” Id.
 251. See 1 NATES ET AL., supra note 35, § 8.04. 
252. See id. § 8.04[2].  Connecticut and Georgia are two states that expressly allow 
recovery of postdeath hedonic damages.  See McQurter v. City of Atlanta, 572 F. Supp. 
1401, 1422 (N.D. Ga. 1983); Mather v. Griffin Hosp., 540 A.2d 666, 678 (Conn. 1988). 
253. See 629 F. Supp. 159, 160 (N.D. Ill. 1985), aff’d, 827 F.2d 195 (7th Cir. 1987),
rev’d on other grounds on reh’g en banc, 835 F.2d 802 (7th Cir. 1988).  42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 (2006) states,
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities 
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an 
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that 
in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in 
such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a 
declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.
254. Sherrod, 629 F. Supp. at 163. 
255.  Id. at 164. 
256. See id.
 257. See id.  “In England, for example, hedonic damage awards have been allowed 
since 1976.  Section 1 of the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act of 1934 has 
been construed by English judges so that the estate of a person killed can recover for ‘loss of










        
















     






     
 Nevertheless, some courts refuse to allow for the recovery of hedonic
damages in wrongful death actions.259  In addition, economists frequently 
argue that hedonic damages should not be allowed in wrongful death
actions because it would allow for the recovery of billions of dollars in
awards, distorting the tort system and the economy.260 
IV. THE PROPER MANNER IN WHICH TO FILL THE GAPS IN THE LAW 
AND PREVENT FUTURE INJUSTICES
A. All State and Federal Courts Should Allow for the Recovery of 
Hedonic Damages Separate from Pain and Suffering  
Damage Awards 
Loss of enjoyment of life damages should be classified as a separate 
category from pain and suffering damages because of the methods used
to prove damages, the appellate process of review, and the defendant’s
obligation to fully compensate the plaintiff.261  In addition, courts should
allow recovery of both types of damages regardless of whether mental or 
physical pain and suffering accompany them.  Because personal injury 
damages “restore the injured person to the state of health he had prior to
his injuries because that is the only way the law knows how to recompense 
one for personal injuries suffered,”262 loss of enjoyment of life damages 
should be separate from pain and suffering to allow for the full recovery
of injuries suffered.263  This separation allows for the “person responsible
for the injury [to] respond for all damages resulting directly from and as 
a natural consequence of the wrongful act.”264 
259. See, e.g., Clement v. Conrail Rail Corp., 734 F. Supp. 151, 156 (D. N.J. 1989)
(holding that hedonic damages are not available under the state’s wrongful death act). 
260. See Thomas Havrilesky, Errors in the Application of Hedonic Damages to
Wrongful Death and Injury Litigation, in THE ECONOMIC EXPERT IN LITIGATION: 1993, at 
57, 58 (Donald J. Hirsch & Pamela M. Kaplan eds., 1993). 
261. See Cramer, supra note 43, at 973. 
262.  Romeo v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 341 N.Y.S.2d 733, 735 (App. Div. 1973). 
263. See Cramer, supra note 43, at 965.  Cramer argued that “[i]n those jurisdictions
which fail to recognize loss of enjoyment of life as a separate element of damages, plaintiffs 
are less likely to receive adequate compensation for their injuries.” Id.
264. Steitz v. Gifford, 19 N.E.2d 661, 664 (N.Y. 1939).  An increase in the amount
of damages recoverable by a plaintiff in a persistent vegetative state may upset those 
who believe that the tort system no longer successfully requires the wrongdoers to pay
for their actions.  See Tom Baker, Blood Money, New Money, and the Moral Economy of 
Tort Law in Action, 35 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 275, 275 (2001) (“That personal injury litigation 
revolves around liability insurance has become almost a truism among tort teachers, 
scholars, and practitioners alike.”).  A distinction is often drawn between “blood money”
and “insurance money.”  See id. at 276.  Blood money is “money paid directly to plaintiffs by
defendants out of their own pockets.”  Id.  Blood money, therefore, fulfills the corrective 
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The tort reform movement’s focus on and fear of excessive pain and 
suffering damage awards is misguided.265  The movement’s limits on
pain and suffering damages have been successful despite the little evidence 
available showing awards to be markedly high.266  The absence of any 
guidance on proper compensation levels has led many courts and legislatures 
to believe that pain and suffering damages have become excessive.267 
However, this shortage of uniformity in pain and suffering damage awards 
calls for rules that help define the elements to be considered in calculating
from liability insurance and is “bargain[ed] for . . . in the shadow of law.”  See id. at 276. 
The source of a plaintiff’s compensation greatly affects tort litigation. See id. (“[I]nsurance 
money can be imagined as cold, hard, and flat; blood money as hot, soft, and highly
textured.”).  However, the plaintiff’s “legal right to exact blood money retains an important
role in the tort settlement process.”  Id. at 277.  The plaintiff’s ability to assert a right to
blood money helps settlement discussions and continues to punish wrongdoers. Id. In 
addition, some scholars and attorneys believe that money from the defendant’s own 
pocket is not blood money if the defendant failed to purchase enough insurance.  Id. at 296. 
For instance, when an uninsured or underinsured motorist causes a serious collision, the 
motorist’s failure to purchase insurance can be seen as another “bad” act, therefore
requiring the person to pay out of pocket.  Id.  “This finding reflects a moral judgment that
people have a responsibility to purchase insurance.  The failure to meet that responsibility
is itself a wrongful act.” Id.  Interestingly, jury instructions regularly omit information
regarding the source of the damages, including any “insurance carried by the litigants.”
Greene & Bornstein, supra note 107, at 755.  The rationale behind this omission “is that 
(a) the procedure will prevent bias that might be introduced by the undisclosed
information, (b) some facts are so complex that they might confuse rather than educate the
jury, and (c) certain evidence simply lacks probative value and wastes the jury’s time.” Id.
 265. See Mark Geistfeld, Placing a Price on Pain and Suffering: A Method for Helping 
Juries Determine Tort Damages for Nonmonetary Injuries, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 773, 777
(1995).
266. See id.
 267. See id. & n.8 (citing W. KIP VISCUSI, REFORMING PRODUCTS LIABILITY 100
(1991)) (“[T]he absence of any well-defined criteria for setting compensation levels has led 
many observers to speculate that there has been an escalation of pain and suffering awards.”).
In those states that responded to the tort reform movement by capping damage awards at 
a specific limit, the caps are usually “an absolute limit, a maximum permitted ratio (i.e.,
a certain multiple of the compensatory damages), or both.”  Greene & Bornstein, supra
note 107, at 761.  Some argue that caps provide “unmistakable guidance to juries, trial 
courts, and appellate courts.” See Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789, 809 (Utah 
1991). However, caps can “place artificial limits on the jury’s ability to assess awards 
commensurate with the defendant’s behavior, thereby blunting the effect of punitive damages
as a weapon of punishment and deterrence.”  Greene & Bornstein, supra note 107, at 
761. Capping jury awards has also been found to increase “both the size and variability
of the plaintiff’s awards,” thereby working against the very purpose of establishing the 













   
  
   
 
    
    
    
  
   
  




     
  
 
   




    
   
   
 
 
damages, rather than the general denial of pain and suffering.268  Because
the fear of excessive pain and suffering damages can be handled without
directly limiting the damages, courts should not consider loss of enjoyment
of life damages another “excessive” award.269  Instead, courts could separate
loss of enjoyment of life damages from pain and suffering damages and 
fully compensate the plaintiff for all the wrongdoings.270
 The McDougald court’s ruling failed to apply the obvious distinction
between pain and suffering and “the emotional response caused by the
limitation of life’s activities.”271  The Court of Appeals of New York 
concluded that allowing a separate award for loss of enjoyment of life 
damages would only “amplify the speculative and ‘distorted’ nature of 
nonpecuniary damages.”272  In “bowing to a public policy of limiting
malpractice awards,” the court “relied on an internally inconsistent rationale 
that is unresponsive to the noncompensatory goals of tort damages.”273 
As noted by Judge Titone in his dissent in McDougald, loss of enjoyment of
268. See Geistfeld, supra note 265, at 777.  “To be sure, there is evidence that supports
the need for some type of reform.  Studies have shown that jury awards for pain and suffering
vary widely for injuries that appear to be equally severe.” Id.
269. See Gary R. Albrecht, The Application of the Hedonic Damages Concept to
Wrongful Death and Personal Injury Litigation, 7 J. FORENSIC ECON. 143, 148–49 (1994).
Economists accept that “when the price of a resource does not reflect the value that society
places on it, the allocation of that resource will be sub-optimal.” Id.  If the amount a
defendant pays in damages in personal injury cases is “less than the value” society places 
on the plaintiff’s enjoyment of life, the number of personal injury cases will “exceed the
optimal number.” Id. Canadian courts have also decided to limit nonpecuniary damages. See
Stephen Waddams, The Price of Excessive Damage Awards, 27 SYDNEY L. REV. 543, 
551 (2005).  Because of the limit, which is currently $300,000, Canadian courts often have
trouble determining if the upper limit placed on the more serious injuries also places a lower
limit on the less serious injuries. See id.  Additionally, by limiting the amount recoverable in
even the most serious cases, Canadian courts are implying that there is “an artificial limit 
on some otherwise appropriate higher figure to which the plaintiff has a natural entitlement.”
Id.
 270. See Ronen Avraham, Putting a Price on Pain-and-Suffering Damages: A Critique 
of the Current Approaches and a Preliminary Proposal for Change, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 
87, 88 (2006).  Those who support the awarding of pain and suffering damages frequently cite
deterrence as support for their view.  See id.  By requiring defendants to pay for their 
transgressions, pain and suffering damages make defendants “bear the full social cost of 
their conduct.” Id.  This same argument supports the requirement that a defendant also
pay for a plaintiff’s loss of enjoyment of life.
271. McDougald v. Garber, 536 N.E.2d 372, 376 (N.Y. 1989); see also Recent Case, 
Damages — Loss of Enjoyment of Life — New York Court of Appeals Denies Loss-of-
Enjoyment Damages to Comatose Plaintiffs, 103 HARV. L. REV. 811, 812 (1990) [hereinafter
Damages — Loss of Enjoyment of Life] (discussing McDougald).
272. Damages — Loss of Enjoyment of Life, supra note 271, at 813 (citing McDougald, 
536 N.E.2d at 376–77). 
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life damages compensate for an “objective” loss274 and therefore are 
separate from “the emotional response to the loss of life’s pursuits” that
is part of pain and suffering.275 In addition, because there is a clear
distinction between the two types of damages, “separate awards would 
both increase accuracy and facilitate appellate review.”276  This distinction 
between the two types of damages would provide clarity to an area that
the tort reform movement argues is extremely speculative.277 
Ohio, West Virginia, and New Jersey all provide an appropriate model for
how courts should treat loss of enjoyment of life damages and pain and
suffering damages.278  Courts should consider loss of enjoyment of life
damages separate from pain and suffering, either as its own category of
damages or as part of a separate category.279  In Holston, the Illinois
Appellate Court appropriately concluded that loss of enjoyment of life
damages are part of disability damages and therefore recoverable separate
from pain and suffering damages.280  In a rather circular argument, the
Holston court stated that disability damages compensate for the “disabling 
effect of the injury,”281 and disability rationally includes the loss of enjoyment 
of life because a person who has lost consciousness is unaware of the
loss.282  Because a plaintiff who has suffered loss of enjoyment of life
is precluded from enjoying life’s pleasures, such as “enjoy[ing] the 
274. See McDougald, 536 N.E.2d at 379 (Titone, J., dissenting) (“‘[L]oss of enjoyment 
of life compensates the victim for the limitations on the person’s life created by the
injury,’ a distinctly objective loss.” (quoting Thompson v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 621
F.2d 814, 824 (6th Cir. 1980))). 
275. Damages — Loss of Enjoyment of Life, supra note 271, at 814. 
276. Id.  Because juries can clearly distinguish between the two types of damages,
it is logical to conclude that allowing for separate awards of hedonic and pain and suffering 
damages “would contribute to accuracy and precision in thought in the jury’s deliberations on
the issue of damages.”  McDougald, 536 N.E.2d at 379 (Titone, J., dissenting). 
277. See 9 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 53, app. N. 
278. See supra Part III.B.2.
279. Loss of enjoyment of life damages can be included in categories such as 
“disability,” “permanency of injury,” or “impairment.”  Disability damages “focus[] on the 
lessening of the plaintiff’s abilities from 100 percent rather than on the plaintiff’s 
particular activities and hobbies.”  Zitter, supra note 63, at 64. Before a jury can award 
damages for the permanency of an injury, there should be a presentation by an expert witness 
on the subject of permanency.  Id. at 67. Impairment damages compensate the victim for 
the inability “to pursue one’s normal activities” and for “the status of being limited or
incapacitated.” Eyoma v. Falco, 589 A.2d 653, 661–62 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991).
280. See Holston v. Sisters of the Third Order of St. Francis, 618 N.E.2d 334, 347
(Ill. App. Ct. 1993). 
281. Id.
























      
  
  




   
   





occupation of [one’s] choice, activities of daily living, social leisure activities,
and internal well-being,”283 the plaintiff’s ability to enjoy life has been 
significantly “disabled” and the plaintiff is therefore deserving of disability
damages.284 
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia also properly included
loss of enjoyment of life damages in a separate category from pain and 
suffering.285  The Flannery I court came to this conclusion through the
discussion of its definition of permanent injury, which includes “those 
future effects of an injury which have reduced the capability of an individual
to function as a whole man.”286  By categorizing loss of enjoyment 
of life damages as a single “element” to be considered in damage awards, 
the Flannery I court avoided criticism for double recovery of the same 
damages.287  State and federal courts should follow the Flannery court’s
example and consider loss of enjoyment of life damages as a single
component in the overall determination of damage awards. 
   By recognizing the requirement that there be “just and adequate
compensation for the interruption of mental and physical functions,” 
courts further support the separation of loss of enjoyment of life damages 
from pain and suffering.288  By rendering a plaintiff unconscious, a
wrongdoer deprives the plaintiff of the enjoyment the plaintiff would
have otherwise experienced in life.289  This concept, although difficult to
explain, is not “too esoteric for a jury to understand and evaluate.”290  The 
Superior Court of New Jersey based its holding in Eyoma on this deprivation 
of life, recognizing that juries are able to comprehend the loss of life 
experienced by an unconscious plaintiff.291  In order to avoid the unjust
situation of denying damages for the obvious loss of a joyous life experienced 
by comatose plaintiffs, courts should allow juries to determine how much
loss of enjoyment of life comatose plaintiffs have suffered. 
283. Victor E. Schwartz & Cary Silverman, Hedonic Damages: The Rapidly Bubbling
Cauldron, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1037, 1038 (2004) (quoting Smith v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 
214 F.3d 1235, 1245 (10th Cir. 2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
284. See WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH 
LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED 642 (1986). Webster’s Dictionary defines disability as “the 
condition of being disabled: deprivation or lack esp. of physical, intellectual, or emotional 
capacity or fitness.”  Id.
 285. See Flannery v. United States (Flannery I), 297 S.E.2d 433, 438 (W. Va. 1982).
286. Id. at 437 (quoting Jordan v. Bero, 210 S.E.2d 618, 634 (W. Va. 1974)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
287. See Flannery I, 297 S.E.2d at 438.  “Just as a jury may consider the nature, effect 
and severity of pain when fixing damages for personal injury, or may consider mental anguish
caused by scars and disfigurement, it may consider loss of enjoyment of life.”  Id.
288. See Eyoma v. Falco, 589 A.2d 653, 662 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991). 
289.  See id. 
 290. Id.
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Additionally, the separation of hedonic damages from pain and suffering 
in survival and wrongful death actions bolsters the argument that the two 
are distinct types of damages.292  Because survival actions are based on 
the recovery of damages that the deceased could have recovered but for 
death, the same problem is posed with regard to distinctions between
various types of compensatory damages.293 
Commentators argue that pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of 
life damages should be grouped together because of “the similar 
circumstances and seemingly parallel methods of proof surrounding the
two concepts.”294 Courts rarely consider pain and suffering damages as 
two separate elements; they have a “complementary relationship” that
necessitates treating them as a “unitary concept.”295  Because pain and 
suffering and loss of enjoyment of life damages also arise in comparable
situations, courts often decide to merge the two types of damages.296 
However, this concept incorrectly classifies the methods of proof courts 
use in determining loss of enjoyment of life damages.297  Pain and suffering
focuses on the suffering and accompanying pain caused by a specific 
injury.298  By contrast, loss of enjoyment of life damages focus on the
“limitations placed on a person’s ability to enjoy the amenities of life.”299 
In determining the amount of loss of enjoyment a plaintiff has suffered, 
the fact finder must consider “the nature and extent of plaintiff’s lifestyle
292. See supra Part III.B.2.
 293. See 1 NATES ET AL., supra note 35, § 8.04. 
294. Cramer, supra note 43, at 978. 
295. Id.
 296. Id.  Loss of enjoyment of life damages and pain and suffering damages are 
treated the same for the purposes of determining what is taxable under the Internal Revenue
Code.  See I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (2006).  Under the Internal Revenue Code, gross income does 
not include “the amount of any damages (other than punitive damages) received (whether by
suit or agreement and whether as lump sums or as periodic payments) on account of 
personal physical injuries or physical sickness.” Id. Any damages that are recovered 
“on account of” a physical injury must be recovered “because of” physical injury in order
to be excluded from gross income.  See Murphy v. IRS, 460 F.3d 79, 84 (D.C. Cir. 2006).  In 
Murphy v. IRS, the plaintiff recovered damages for past and future emotional distress
caused by her employer’s actions, which were in violation of a federal whistleblower statute.
Id. at 81.  The emotional distress resulted in physical manifestations. Id. The Murphy court 
determined that damages for emotional distress with physical manifestations are not received 
because of physical injury but are received because of emotional injury and therefore are 
not excludable under I.R.C. § 104(a)(2).  Id. at 84. 



























   
   
  
  
   
     




    
 
 
     




prior to being injured” and the “limited lifestyle of the plaintiff afterwards.”300 
This allows for courts to ascertain the loss suffered by a plaintiff “with a
reasonable degree of certainty.”301 
Carefully drafted jury instructions will allow every jurisdiction to award 
both pain and suffering and hedonic damages, while avoiding the duplicative 
nature these damages can take on.302  Without separate awards, the tort
system cannot fulfill its goal of “reasonable compensation to the plaintiff.”303 
Detailed jury instructions will also prevent speculation on what the jury
considered in calculating the total amount to award.304  Using carefully 
crafted jury instructions to separate loss of enjoyment of life damages from 
pain and suffering also supports the appellate process.305 Appellate courts
can order new trials only if the damages awarded by a jury are “so
300. Id. at 979 (emphasis omitted). 
301. Id.
 302. See id. at 983.  For example, section 501.1 of the jury instruction concerning
personal injury damages in Florida states, “You should award (claimant) an amount of
money that the greater weight of the evidence shows will fairly and adequately compensate
[claimant] . . . for [claimant’s] . . . [loss] [injury] [or] [damage], including any damage 
(claimant) is reasonably certain to [incur] [experience] in the future.” Standard Jury 
Instructions – Civil Cases, FLORIDA SUP. CT. (last visited Nov. 24, 2013), available at 
http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/civ_jury_instructions/instructions.shtml#500. Section
501.2(a) goes on to state that plaintiffs can recovery for “[a]ny bodily injury . . . and any
resulting pain and suffering [disability or physical impairment] [disfigurement] [mental
anguish] [inconvenience] [or] [loss of capacity for the enjoyment of life] experienced in 
the past [or to be experienced in the future].”  Id.  If implemented properly, these Florida 
jury instructions allow for the recovery of loss of enjoyment of life damages separate
from pain and suffering damages, without being duplicative. The Ninth Circuit Model
Civil Jury Instructions also properly separate hedonic damages from pain and suffering 
damages. See Manual of Model Civil Jury Instructions, U.S. COURTS FOR NINTH CIRCUIT
(last visited Nov. 24, 2013), available at http://www.akd.uscourts.gov/docs/general/model
_jury_civl.pdf.  The Ninth Circuit model instructions allow for multiple types of damages to
be incorporated in the instruction, including disability, disfigurement, and loss of enjoyment
of life experienced separate from mental, physical, or emotional pain and suffering. Id.
In Colorado, on the other hand, jurors are asked to award an amount of damages that will 
“reasonably compensate the plaintiff for his injuries.”  Greene & Bornstein, supra note 
107, at 745.  In determining the amount of the award, the jurors are to consider “[a]ny
noneconomic losses or injuries incurred . . . including: pain and suffering; inconvenience; 
emotional stress; [and] impairment of the quality of life.”  Id. at 745 (quoting COLORADO 
JURY INSTRUCTION 3D: CIVIL (1989) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  The Colorado 
jury instructions do not even attempt to list all of the types of noneconomic damages 
available, let alone define them, making it a “more difficult task [to determine damages] 
than deciding on liability.” Id. (quoting COLORADO JURY INSTRUCTION 3D: CIVIL (1989)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
303. Cramer, supra note 43, at 983–84. 
304. See id. at 984.  Because of the vague instructions that are often given, jurors 
are not “instructed on the definitions of various terms (e.g., pain and suffering, emotional
stress), about how to consider and weigh these components, or about how to translate these 
components into an aggregate award.”  Greene & Bornstein, supra note 107, at 746. 
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grossly inadequate as to leave no reasonable doubt that they resulted 
from passion or prejudice.”306  By separating loss of enjoyment of life 
damages from pain and suffering, the appellate court would have more 
information to use in reviewing the jury’s damages award.307  The separation 
of the damage awards would also provide more guidance to the parties, 
allowing them to determine whether an appeal is necessary or even
worthwhile.308 Therefore, the separation of hedonic damages from pain 
and suffering would benefit “litigants, jurors and the courts.”309 
B. Every Court Should Permit Plaintiffs in a Persistent Vegetative           
State To Recover Hedonic Damages 
   Withholding loss of enjoyment of life damages from comatose plaintiffs is 
contrary to general tort principles.310  Tort damages compensate victims and
provide motivation for members of society to exercise due care.311  Courts
306. Id.; see also Roberts v. Bushore, 182 So. 2d 401, 401 (Fla. 1966) (“[A] verdict 
for grossly inadequate damages stands on the same ground as a verdict for excessive or
extravagant damages and . . . a new trial may be readily granted in the one case as the other.”);
Carter v. Reese, 258 S.E.2d 165, 166 (Ga. Ct. App. 1979) (“[T]o grant a new trial at the 
appellate level it must appear that the damages are either so small or so excessive as to 
justify the inference of gross mistake or undue bias.”). 
307. See Cramer, supra note 43, at 984. 
308. See id.
 309. Id.  The vagueness that is common to jury instructions regarding damages may
be partially attributed to the inherent vagueness of the law of damages in general.  See 
Greene & Bornstein, supra note 107, at 747.  Many jurisdictions lack a standard “defining
when a certain kind of damage award . . . is appropriate . . . in part because it is difficult
to identify the particular circumstances in which these damages may be relevant.” Id.
To some, this is viewed as an advantage.  Id.  Vague award standards are flexible and
can take into account “the individualized facts of a particular case.”  Id.  However, the 
ambiguous directions may cause jurors to “subvert justice by relying on their biases, 
prejudices, and whims.”  Id.  In addition, ambiguous directions may cause jurors to confuse 
their discussions on liability with those for damages. Id. (“[L]acking clear guidance on 
what evidence they can legitimately use to assess damages, jurors may factor elements of 
the evidence on liability into their calculation of damages.”).
310. See Damages — Loss of Enjoyment of Life, supra note 271, at 816. 
311. See id. Damages awarded to plaintiffs in persistent vegetative states may be
improper because the awards go to the families of the victims and are not actually spent 
by the victims themselves.  See McGee v. A C and S, Inc., 2005-1036, pp. 11–12 (La. 
7/10/06); 933 So. 2d 770, 779 (holding that hedonic damages are recoverable by a tort 
victim “for the loss of enjoyment of life sustained during the victim’s lifetime, [but are]
not recoverable by the primary tort victim’s family members who are eligible to recover
for loss of consortium, service and society under La. C.C. art. 2315(B)”). However, 
withholding compensatory damages from comatose plaintiffs would encourage tortfeasors to



























   
  





   
   
  
   
  
 
will not deter defendants from causing egregious harm by giving smaller 
awards to plaintiffs who suffer from the most serious injuries.312  In addition,
allowing for the recovery of loss of enjoyment of life damages provides an
incentive for plaintiffs to sue,313 which according to Judge Posner “is 
essential to the maintenance of the tort system as an effective deterrent
to negligence.”314
 The McDougald standard to determine whether plaintiffs are entitled 
to certain damages will lead to an obvious injustice suffered by comatose 
plaintiffs.315  In holding that the recovery of loss of enjoyment of life requires 
some quantity of cognitive awareness,316 the majority ignored the fact 
that the plaintiff’s loss of awareness, “including her inability to perceive
anguish,” is itself a significant loss that should be compensated.317  The  
claim that personal injury damages must compensate recognizable injury
usually allows for the recovery of subjective losses and objective losses.318 
A plaintiff in a persistent vegetative state, however, can recover only for
objective losses because it is impossible to prove any subjective loss when a
plaintiff is comatose.319  The McDougald court incorrectly decided that 
loss of enjoyment of life damages are subjective.320  Courts should recognize 
that plaintiffs in a persistent vegetative state remain alive, and their ability to
live full lives has been reduced because they are unable to live as uninjured
addition, although it is very unlikely, a plaintiff might emerge from a coma.  See Susan
Donaldson James, Poised To Donate Organs, 21-Year-Old Emerges from Coma, ABC NEWS
(Dec. 22, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/Health/arizona-accident-victim-emerges-coma-
poised-donate-organs/story?id=15208351#.UU4V6JNetgs.  Sam Schmid was hours away
from being taken off life support when he emerged from his coma.  Id.  He is expected to 
make a full recovery. Id.  If Sam were injured in an accident that would entitle him to 
damages from a tortfeasor, those damages would be very helpful in his road to recovery. 
312. See Damages — Loss of Enjoyment of Life, supra note 271, at 816.  The denial 
of loss of enjoyment of life damages “will provide a perverse incentive to physicians by
rewarding them for a greater lapse of care.” Id.
 313. See id.
 314. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 176 (3d ed. 1986).  By
limiting the damages available to comatose plaintiffs, courts “raise[] the possibility that 
comatose plaintiffs, their families, and their attorneys will pursue malpractice claims less 
vigorously than they have in the past. This disincentive to plaintiffs will in turn reduce
the deterrent effect of malpractice claims on physicians and hospitals.”  Damages — 
Loss of Enjoyment of Life, supra note 271, at 816. 
315. See supra notes 165, 175–76 and accompanying text. 
316. See McDougald v. Garber, 536 N.E.2d 372, 375 (N.Y. 1989). 
317. Damages — Loss of Enjoyment of Life, supra note 271, at 815. 
318. See id. at 814.  Subjective losses include pain and suffering, and objective losses
include lost wages. Id.
 319. See id.
 320. See id. The majority asserted that hedonic damages are “associated with a 
victim’s decreased ability to enjoy her life” and therefore are part of pain and suffering
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people do.321 The existence of “life’” should not be determined by the
existence of consciousness.322  The McDougald court based its decision
on the “punitive nature” of hedonic damages recovered by comatose
plaintiffs, without realizing that its holding adds “value judgments that 
have no place in the law of tort recovery.”323  The McDougald court’s
ruling is further flawed in that the majority failed to define what level of
cognitive awareness is required to recover hedonic damages.324  As  
stated by Judge Titone in his dissent in McDougald, the lack of clarity in 
the levels of “awareness” allows for the possibility that “a plaintiff might
not have sufficient awareness to appreciate the meaning of the award,”
creating an “arbitrary” rule that is contrary to the tort system’s goals.325
 The Eyoma court logically concluded that a plaintiff in a persistent 
vegetative state is not able to carry on the plaintiff’s normal activities 
and pursuits, which in turn causes loss or damage.326  The court in Eyoma
stated that “[t]he victim’s inability to be presently aware of the loss may
prevent further pain and suffering over those inabilities; however, it does 
not diminish the loss of enjoyment that the human being otherwise would
have experienced.”327  Instead of creating a potential injustice simply 
because of a court’s fear of the difficulty in measuring loss of joy, Eyoma
accepts the challenge and puts faith in a jury’s ability to understand and 
evaluate what a patient in a persistent vegetative state loses.328 
321. See id.
 322. See id.  Consciousness as a prerequisite to life has long been debated in the 
philosophical and scientific world.  Compare  KARL MARX & FREDERICK ENGELS, THE 
GERMAN IDEOLOGY 47 (C.J. Arthur ed., Int’l Publishers 1970) (“Life is not determined 
by consciousness, but consciousness by life.”), with Jenny Seneor, Consciousness Determines 
Life, THE GREAT REFUSAL (June 1, 2008), http://thegreatrefusal.wordpress.com/2008/06/01/
conciousness-determines-life/ (stating that Pierre Bourdieu rejected Marx’s theory and 
“subscribe[d] to the conception that our physical existence is structured by the prevailing 
ideologies (through a domination that exists in embodiment)”). 
323. See McDougald v. Garber, 536 N.E.2d 372, 378 (N.Y. 1989). 
324. See id. at 375.  “We do not go so far, however, as to require the fact finder to 
sort out varying degrees of cognition and determine at what level a particular deprivation
can be fully appreciated.” Id.
 325. Damages — Loss of Enjoyment of Life, supra note 271, at 814 (citing McDougald, 
536 N.E.2d at 379 (Titone, J., dissenting)). 
326. Eyoma v. Falco, 589 A.2d 653, 661–62 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991).  “Surely
part of what is lost is the real personal joy and pleasure that the comatose victim might 
otherwise have experienced.” Id. at 662. 
327. Id.
 328. See id.
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The purpose of the tort system is to compensate the victim, thereby
making the plaintiff whole.329  Because loss of enjoyment of life damages
are distinct and separate from pain and suffering damages, courts should 
consider the two types of damages as separate categories and allow for
their simultaneous recovery.330  This will allow unconscious plaintiffs to 
recover loss of enjoyment of life damages, which will in turn give them 
the only available compensation for their loss and allow the law to make
them as whole as possible.331 
329. See Flannery v. United States (Flannery I), 297 S.E.2d 433, 435 (W. Va. 1982); 
Hubbard, supra note 41, at 440.  “The basic goal in awarding damages is to fairly and 
adequately compensate the plaintiff for the injuries and losses sustained.” Flannery I, 
297 S.E.2d at 435. 
330. See supra Part IV.A. 
331. See supra Part IV.B.
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